{"id":35999,"date":"2024-03-05T16:30:00","date_gmt":"2024-03-05T15:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/?p=35999"},"modified":"2025-09-29T21:08:30","modified_gmt":"2025-09-29T19:08:30","slug":"hesse-on-fire-what-you-can-say-about-it-from-the-pier","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/hessen-im-feuer-was-man-so-von-der-pier-aus-dazu-sagen-kann\/","title":{"rendered":"\"Hesse\" on fire - what you can say about it \"from the pier\""},"content":{"rendered":"

Just like the first shots fired by the \"Hessians\", many a report and many a statement on the subject were also quite off the mark. The difference is that the \"Hessen\" is drawing conclusions from this. And the leadership is facing it. We are trying to clarify the events as far as we can and want to know....
\n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The frigate \"Hessen\" moved from its base on Crete through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea immediately after receiving a parliamentary mandate to assemble the contingent for the EU Operation Aspides. There it was approached by UAV shortly after arriving in the area. Not everything went as planned during the operation.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Major mishaps are usually heralded by a bloodcurdling and terrifyingly ugly noise! Not in this case: on the night of 25 February 2024, the \"Hessen\" used its long-range missiles to combat an unknown, unidentifiable flying object that was obviously not part of the allied scenario - and nothing happened. No explosion, no fireworks - the thing just flew on. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Perhaps it was just as well, because it was an MQ-9 Reaper reconnaissance drone controlled from US CENTCOM in Bahrain - unregistered and with its IFF transponder switched off. How could all this happen?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The following passage from a parliamentary briefing of the past few days provides factual clarification and sober answers - not exhaustive, but certainly satisfying the media's hunger for sensationalism:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\"On 24 February 2014, the frigate HESSEN detected a suspicious unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). As the call procedure for identification was unsuccessful, the HESSEN informed ships and aircraft of allied partners in the area about the UAV and initiated defence measures on the basis of the Rules of Engagement. The missiles fired could not be brought to bear, so that the UAV, which was subsequently assigned to an allied partner nation, was not engaged. This was due to a technical error in a radar system on board the frigate HESSEN. The error was quickly identified and could be rectified immediately. There are therefore no deficits in the chain of command of the weapon system used.\"<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

So much for the incident, which shows all parties that when switching from peacetime operations with practice firing and also live firing at a tame target to real combat and actual life-threatening situations, some things have to be learnt and experienced first, because the technical-physical and human-psychological situation is fundamentally different. Nevertheless, the first hurdle has been overcome and has led to clear learning effects on board, in the navy and also in the US services involved.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"
The frigate \"Sachsen\" fires an SM-2 missile. Photo: Bundeswehr<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The class 124 frigate<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The \"Hessen\" is a class 124 anti-aircraft frigate designed for air defence and convoy protection. However, it can also do much more and also has helicopters on board. It was expensive, very expensive - but its military capabilities were so good that the US Navy requested Sachsen-class ships for the air defence umbrella of the Gerald R. Ford carrier group, integrated them into its strike group and even certified them. This ship could also be used to combat intercontinental missiles if the additional investment was made. The German Navy only has three of them, \"Sachsen\", \"Hamburg\" and \"Hessen\". Not only does it have more than other nations, it also has a capacity that is the envy of other navies. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The first time . .<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

She is one of the best we have in our inventory - fully equipped, ammunitioned and at the highest possible level of training. What the ship and crew lack is war experience. Up to now, the German Navy has mostly only had to utilise the ships' capabilities in less demanding and threatening situations. There have been missions against pirates, embargoes, aid for boat refugees and presence operations - not always without danger, but never real war. Integrated into the carrier group, the \"Hessen\" (see <\/span><\/span><\/span>marine forum<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span> Issue 1-2\/24), but missiles were always fired under laboratory conditions, in good weather and well prepared, because missiles are incredibly expensive.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

. . . it still hurts<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Never before in the history of the German Navy has such an unpredictably equipped enemy as the Houthi militias fired a live shot at a naval vessel with the intention of killing Germans. And in the very first real live firing - ad hoc, in a foreign environment with unknown partners - they only hit the target on the \"second\" attempt, so to speak. What one person might consider embarrassing and absolutely impossible turned out to be an absolutely favourable coincidence - in hindsight, as we now know. Could it all have been avoided? Perhaps. If we had practised <\/span><\/span><\/span>can? No - we're going round in circles! No problem, everyone is safe and sound, the crew have done their job well.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Education<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

It has now been proven that during the years of \"low-end\" missions, the navy fiercely resisted cutting back on expensive high-end training - both at home and at the Royal Navy in Plymouth. They always wanted to maintain the \"high-end\" capability, because that's what the ships were built for. Hunting pirates with these ships are the famous pearls in the pigsty. But the Admiralty had managed to get its way - fortunately, otherwise the \"Hessians\" would not have been allowed to be sent now. And Europe without German participation would have been embarrassing indeed. The navy has kept its promise <\/span><\/span><\/span>held.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Ammunition<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

And now to the debate about ammunition: of course there are too few, everyone knows that, because the Minister of Defence and the Inspector of the Navy have repeated it like a mantra. No one can deny the problem, as the war in Ukraine shows us every day. Nevertheless, the \"Hessen\" was sent because its magazines are filled to the brim. And not only first-person shooters understand that ammunition runs out at some point. There are reasons why we have too little overall: Until now, everything was more important than buying missiles. We were in Afghanistan, in Mali and in many other smaller missions. First there was a financial crisis, the Bundeswehr was reorganised, then there were refugees. There was enough money for the ships that had been promised to NATO, but there were savings on ammunition. How much was actually bought can be read in the Griephan letters, which every military expert knows. The inspector is constantly putting pressure on us, but he has not yet received the missiles he ordered. Perhaps he will now be listened to when the 124s come home empty - hopefully unscathed.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

What else we know and can clarify<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
Frigate \"Hessen\", cover page of marineforum, current issue. Photo: Michael Nitz<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

To the wide-range sensor<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The SMART-L long-range sensor obviously fulfilled its function quite well, otherwise the \"Hessen\" would not have detected a distant US drone at all. Here, too, the ship did everything right: a target was recognised without friend or foe detection (IFF) - the query to the coalition partners in the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and within its own EU coalition Aspides remained without result<\/span><\/span><\/span>- in this respect: Control decision.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Since it was - as was later established - a US drone, either the US agency in question did not have a clear picture of the situation (this also happens), or it was not supposed to have a picture because the drone was flying for \"another agency\". A small hint: US ships share in certain types of operations <\/span><\/span><\/span>your LINK situation picture NOT <\/span><\/span><\/span>with allies of the \"second tier\" (\"Non\" 5-Eyes, FVEY = post-war intelligence agreement AUS, CAN, NZL, UK and US).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

For unsuccessful control<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The target was not one of those for which an SM-2 mission (Raytheon Standard Missile, range up to 100 nautical miles (170 kilometres)) was originally designed, namely supersonic bombers such as \"Backfire\" and substantial missiles on a direct approach. In this case, the target flew \"slowly\" at less than 500 kilometres per hour. In addition, it did not fly directly towards the ship, but passed right by it. However, this reduces the probability of a hit the further away the target is - a physical fact known as the cross-range problem, which all defence missiles have to contend with! An error in the fire control solution was found and rectified very quickly using an internally coordinated naval approach.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The problem of age<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The functional chain of the SMART-L long-range sensor \/ APAR fire control system \/ CDS F124 weapon deployment system \/ SM-2 missile is state of the art from the late 1990s. Obsolescence has already occurred here with the entry into service from 2005 and has increased over the last almost 20 years. Against this background, the navy and especially the crew are doing an outstanding job. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

To eliminate obsolescence<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Corresponding naval initiatives from 2006 were rejected with the 2011 Bundeswehr reform and resubmitted in 2013. According to the Functional Capability Requirement (FFF) ObsWuF LV F124, most of these obsolescences should have been eliminated by 2019. However, prioritisation elsewhere due to a lack of funding has delayed this project, as have wrong decisions regarding<\/span><\/span><\/span>solution overall. In 2021, a contract was concluded with the company Hensoldt, which provided for an Israeli long-range radar to replace the Dutch SMART-L. However, integrating this into the Dutch AAW (air defence) system proved to be a \"h<\/span><\/span><\/span>proved to be \"challenging\". So complex that we are currently not looking at a partial start to realisation until 2027, which will inevitably have a negative impact on most other obsolescences.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

It's a bit like trying to integrate an APPLE watch into an ANDROID system using a HUAWEI chip, while technical support is gradually being discontinued.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The <\/span><\/span><\/span>marine forum<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span> reported on several occasions, including in print issues 10 and 11 of 2015 and most recently on <\/span><\/span><\/span>marineforum.online<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span> in November 2020.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n