The navy is on course: 2025, no more ten years for many new builds, but with a pragmatic focus on what can be done quickly and innovative solutions to rapidly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of what is already available. Because only those warships, submarines, aircraft and trained personnel that can be produced quickly or are available before the start of a war will also be available during it - and visibly contribute to deterring an attack.<\/p>\n
However, both the war in Ukraine, which has been going on for over three years, and the logic of nuclear deterrence indicate that war in Europe will not be over quickly in the 21st century either. Just as Since Ukraine's supporters have been holding back out of concern about Russia's nuclear escalation, it is unlikely that the EU and NATO would pursue a rapid military victory over Russia with any vigour, even if the defence against a conventional attack were to be successful in the short term. An essential part of the credible threat against the aggressor is therefore based on the ability to hold out longer than the aggressor.
\nThis perseverance, however, boils down to a competition between the warlike performance of society and the economy - and that depends on the sea. Over 90% of global trade takes place by sea. If war and a war economy were to break out, the continental peninsula of Europe would not only be dependent on military supplies, but also on imports of energy, raw materials and other goods - not just to defend itself, but to survive. And maritime trade is not just about statistics, but about ships - ships that can depart and arrive, be loaded and unloaded and reach their destinations safely. It is therefore not enough to consider the protection of these sea routes only at their point of arrival. What Europe needs to be successful on day 30, day 200 or day 1,000 of a war must also be secured at distant locations.<\/p>\n
Maritime security and naval power are essential in order to cope well with the pre-war or not-yet-war phase of global power-political tensions and hybrid threats - and not to lose power or invite further escalation before it even begins. EU member states are already losing economic potential because offshore wind projects are being abandoned due to uncertainty about hybrid threats, a lack of defence capability and price increases in supply chains. International trade is also becoming more and more power-based - so it will play a significant role whose aircraft carrier groups can operate undisturbed off which coast when it comes to strategic raw material supplies.<\/p>\n
In times of geopolitical logic, sea power is once again paying for itself: the fleet used to protect trade, but today it enables much more far-reaching economic utilisation of the sea. Without effective protection, opportunities for the sustainable use of the ocean, energy sovereignty and economic success lie dormant.
\nJust as shipping and geopolitics are inextricably linked, the navy is also a central instrument of the overall strategy - always with a global horizon. Without permanently secured access to the world via the sea, Europe is not in a position to compete in power politics - and is definitely not fit for war beyond the first few weeks of a major conflict.<\/p>\n
For decades, Germany - at times even as the third largest shipping nation in the world - relied on its allies to protect its global maritime interests. But this is increasingly being called into question. Europe can only become a geopolitical player if it becomes a maritime power - and it can only do both if Germany goes full steam ahead.<\/p>\n
Dr Moritz Brake is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies at the University of Bonn and founder of the companies Nexmaris and Atalantica.<\/p>\n
Moritz Brake<\/i><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Die Marine ist auf Kurs: 2025, keine zehn Jahre Zeit mehr f\u00fcr viele Neubauten, sondern mit pragmatischem Fokus auf das schnell Machbare und innovative L\u00f6sungen zur raschen Erh\u00f6hung der Effizienz und Effektivit\u00e4t dessen, was bereits vorhanden ist. Denn nur das, was schnell produziert werden kann oder an Kriegschiffen, U-Booten, Flugzeugen, ausgebildetem Personal vor Beginn eines […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":47360,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_oasis_is_in_workflow":0,"_oasis_original":0,"_oasis_task_priority":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[19,486,32],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-47357","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-sicherheitspolitik","category-headlines","category-magazin"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47357","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=47357"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47357\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":49022,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/47357\/revisions\/49022"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/47360"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=47357"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=47357"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marineforum.online\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=47357"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}