In September 2020, the armed forces of Greece, Cyprus, France and Italy carried out extensive naval and air manoeuvres in the eastern Mediterranean, accompanied by diplomatic warnings to Turkey to respect the International Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law.
The Turkish Navy had issued several Navtex, in which test drillings of the Research vessel ORUÇ REIS south of Cyprus were announced. This work has been extended until mid-October. At the same time, the drilling vessel YAVUZ is carrying out investigations in the region. Turkish Research vessels are being protected by Turkish naval units and other nations are being asked to stay away from the area. Greece and Cyprus consider the territory in question to be part of their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and are therefore calling on Turkey to cease its drilling activities immediately. The conflict has caused considerable unrest within NATO and the EU and has the potential to destabilise the entire Eastern Mediterranean region.
Not just a gas dispute
The current disputes have their roots in the gas dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which broke out in 2011 when natural gas was discovered in the so-called Afrodite field south-east of Cyprus. At the time, the Turkish Cypriots proposed the joint exploitation of the finds as a confidence-building measure. In any case, they wanted to put this issue on the agenda of the reunification talks organised by the United Nations. However, the Greek Cypriot government rejected this and declared that the Turkish Cypriots would of course also benefit from the gas finds after reunification. This in turn was unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side, as the Greek Cypriots had rejected the Annan Plan in 2004 and thus reunification. For the Turkish Cypriots, this would mean that they would only receive a share of the revenue from the gas business if they accepted the terms of the (Greek Cypriot) government of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot government then authorised the dispatch of the Turkish exploration vessel BARBAROS HAYREDDIN PAŞA to carry out test drilling. This triggered protests from the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. In 2018, the Turkish Navy the Italian ship SAIPEM 12000 of EPI Co., which was licensed by the Republic of Cyprus. In the meantime, the French company Total had also begun test drilling in Greek (2017) and Cypriot waters (2018). In response to the Turkish blockade, an ExxonMobile drillship was escorted by US Navy units in 2018. Turkey did not attempt to prevent this drilling. Since then, both sides have been carrying out test drilling in the sea area that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus consider to be part of their Exclusive Economic Zones.
No simple diplomatic solutions
Direct negotiations on maritime borders and gas rights are currently not possible between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, as Ankara does not recognise the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which was formed by Greek Cypriots. The ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which has been smouldering since the 1950s, remains unresolved to this day. The constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus, founded in 1960, collapsed at the end of 1963. Since 1964, the government of the republic has been in Greek Cypriot hands. In 1964, UN troops were stationed on the island to keep the warring parties apart. In 1974, a coup against the Greek Cypriot government was initiated by the then Athens military junta. This prompted Ankara to invade the island in order to establish a closed settlement area for the Turkish Cypriots in the north. Most of the Greek Cypriots living there were expelled and most of the Turkish Cypriots were resettled in the north. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by Turkey, was proclaimed in the north. Decades of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus have remained unsuccessful to this day.
Legal positions
Research vessel Oruç Reis (Image: MOD Turkey)
Turkey has a mixed position on drilling rights. On the one hand, it accepts that Cyprus has certain rights in the region and insists that these rights must be granted equally to the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, Turkey insists that the Turkish continental shelf should also be included when defining the maritime borders and EEZ between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. In the past, Greece and Turkey have repeatedly argued about the exact delimitation of their maritime areas. The Treaty of Lausanne concluded in 1923, which defined the territorial limit at three nautical miles, is the only undisputed basis between the two states to date. Greece, on the other hand, insists on the application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Greece refers to this convention when defining its own EEZ and claims that it provides for a central borderline between the coastlines of the Greek islands and the Turkish coast (equidistance principle). UNCLOS conflict cases are usually resolved by appealing to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. However, the Court's case law to date does not suggest that it would rule entirely in Greece's favour. In fact, in the past it has repeatedly taken factors such as the length of the coastline and customary law into account in its judgements. In addition, the result of the delimitation should comply with the principles of proportionality, fairness and equity, meaning that Turkey could certainly expect a certain degree of success in such a process. On the other hand, Turkey's refusal to ratify UNCLOS and to recognise the authority of an international court is by no means an unusual occurrence. Australia, for example, has refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over the delimitation of its maritime boundary with Timor-Leste. This resulted in bilateral negotiations between the two states, which ended in 2015 with a joint agreement on the demarcation of the maritime border. Turkey is currently showing no willingness to accede to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and is focussing on bilateral agreements. Despite all the verbal confrontation, there have been repeated rounds of negotiations between Greek and Turkish government representatives in recent times. However, both sides have so far insisted on their maximum demands.
Other players
President Emanuel Macron has declared that France will temporarily increase its military presence in the region in order to better monitor the situation and ensure that international law is respected. To this end, two Rafale multi-role combat aircraft have been stationed on Crete. It was also decided to leave the helicopter carrier TONNERRE, which transported relief supplies to Lebanon, and the frigate LA FAYETTE, which was involved in the naval manoeuvre with Greece, in the region. The naming of the manoeuvre "Evnomia" (rule of law) and Macron's statement that no foreign nation, company or ship should be allowed to enter the sea area without permission can be seen as a barely concealed threat to Turkey. France's involvement is only superficially concerned with compliance with international law in the region - which is not clearly defined anyway - and the gas discoveries are also likely to play a rather subordinate role in view of the unsecured profitability. Rather, France would like to re-establish its role as a regional naval power in the eastern Mediterranean, which it has recently been in danger of losing in the disputes over Syria and Libya. In the process, France has repeatedly come into conflict with Turkey. This is particularly evident in Libya, where Macron more or less openly supports the rebel leader Khalifa Haftar, while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stands by the internationally recognised government in Tripoli. An incident occurred there on 10 June 2020 when the French frigate CORBET approached three Turkish warships escorting the Tanzanian-flagged merchant ship CIRKIN bound for Libya. According to French reports, the Turkish warships had repeatedly directed their fire control radars at the French frigate. Turkey denies the incident. The COURBET withdrew quickly after the incident. France then temporarily suspended its participation in the NATO maritime surveillance mission Sea Guardian.
Several Turkish warships accompanied the Oruç Reis (Photo: MOD Turkey)
Italy's position in this dispute, on the other hand, is far less clear. Although Italian warships were also involved in the naval manoeuvre between Greece and Cyprus, this was not seen by the Italian Ministry of Defence as a political signal, but rather as a routine manoeuvre within the framework of the security partnership with Cyprus and Greece. As the Italian position in Libya is much closer to that of Turkey, this is hardly surprising. Italian Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini therefore also travelled to Ankara in July to underline the common interest in stability in the Mediterranean and at the same time attempted to mediate diplomatically in the dispute between the NATO partners.
Libya's government is particularly reliant on Ankara's support for warlord Haftar from Russia, Egypt and France, so it came as no surprise when Tripoli and Ankara announced an agreement on the mutual delimitation of their maritime zones on 27 November 2019, which is based on the respective continental shelves and clearly overlaps with the EEZ demanded by Greece. Conversely, the Republic of Cyprus has reached agreements with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon (the latter not yet ratified by Lebanon) on the recognition of their respective EEZs. Erdogan's support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the incident with the MAVI MARMARA with the subsequent dispute with Israel certainly contributed to the fact that Turkish sensitivities did not play a role here. When the energy ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority met in Cairo in January 2019 to discuss the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, Turkey, along with Lebanon and Syria, was also not involved.
What could a solution look like?
The European Union finds itself in a dilemma here. As EU member states, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are demanding clear acceptance of their position. They are pushing for sanctions against Turkey in order to force it to give in. Cyprus was therefore even prepared to veto the imposition of sanctions against Belarusian President Lukashenko and has made the EU's prior approval of coercive measures against Ankara a precondition.
However, the EU is anything but united on this issue. While France is focussing on confrontation, the German government is endeavouring to exert its diplomatic influence on both sides in order to reach a negotiated solution. While the EU supports the Greek and Cypriot position in principle, the diplomatic route is to be explored first before further sanctions are imposed on Ankara. However, the predetermination to accept the Greek Cypriot point of view also makes it rather unlikely that the EU could play a decisive role here. Bilateral efforts by Germany and other EU members such as Italy, which have good relations with both Ankara and Athens, are therefore more likely to contribute to a more positive development here.
NATO is also unable to exert pressure on its two quarrelling members, Turkey and Greece. Greece withdrew from mediation talks launched by NATO at the beginning of September, as Turkey did not agree to Athens' precondition of withdrawing its ships from the disputed sea area. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described the talks not as an attempt to resolve the conflict, but merely to de-escalate it.
It is interesting to note that the USA is currently showing no particular interest in engaging in the conflict. The manoeuvre that the American destroyer WINSTON S. CHURCHILL is conducting with the frigates BURGAZADA and BARBADOS of the Turkish Navy which took place almost in parallel with the French-Italian-Greek and Cypriot military exercises, was described by the US Navy as what it was: a routine exercise aimed at improving manoeuvrability, interoperability and communication between the allied forces. Marines and to strengthen joint maritime security efforts. There was no political (re)interpretation of the manoeuvre, as the French, for example, had communicated with regard to their exercises. Nevertheless, the Turkish press interpreted the Turkish-US naval manoeuvres as support for Turkey. The official position of the US government is that the maritime borders must be defined by mutual agreement between the states concerned on the basis of international law. The United States supports dialogue and negotiations and encourages Greece and Turkey to reach an amicable solution in exploratory talks.
In fact, this appears to be a possible solution. On 22 September, Greece and Turkey decided to resume their bilateral exploratory talks. Greece has recently held several successful negotiations regarding its maritime borders. An agreement was signed with Italy on 9 June 2020, in which both sides demonstrated diplomatic creativity. On 6 August, an agreement was then signed with Egypt on the partial delimitation of their respective EEZs. Both agreements show that Greece is perfectly capable of moving away from the principle of equidistance.
It is likely to be more difficult to reach talks between Turkey and the government of the Republic of Cyprus on maritime borders and the joint utilisation of gas reserves. However, this would require the Turkish Cypriots to be involved in some way.
The new negotiations are certainly also due to the diplomatic efforts of various sides. These efforts must not slacken in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict, which neither side wants.
Author Priv.-Doz. Dr Jan Asmussen is a political scientist and historian at the Institute of Social Sciences at Kiel University.
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