In July 2016, the renowned "Center for Strategic International Studies" (CSIS) in Washington D.C., founded by Admiral Arleigh Burke, published the study "Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe". Downloading and reading the almost 50-page work is well worth the time. In the acknowledgements, the attentive reader learns that "experts from Finland, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States" and their respective national institutes contributed significantly to the results. A final thank you is dedicated to the sponsor of the study, "Saab North America", and the team of authors expresses its deep appreciation for Saab's respect for [the team's] intellectual independence.
This blog entry is not intended to be a review of the study, but rather to highlight some aspects of relevance to the German capability for underwater warfare and place them in the context of today's German Navy. Insight deficits - if they are recognisable - are due to the distance of the retired author. A translation of the "Executive Summary" provides the reader in a hurry with the essentials of the work:
"Russia is expanding its underwater deployments as part of a broader strategy of coercion against its neighbours, NATO and the United States. Russia has a long history of expanding its maritime capabilities for strategic signalling purposes, including the use of targeted provocations. Suspected intrusions into territorial waters in the Baltic Sea and provocative operations in the North Atlantic have caused alarm among NATO and partner nations, particularly as they have highlighted the extent to which NATO and its regional partners' submarine hunting capabilities have diminished since the end of the Cold War.
The Russian Navy and its submarine force have been largely unaffected by the economic and manpower challenges posed by Russia's extensive military modernisation efforts. Moscow has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to developing and maintaining its submarine-based strategic deterrent and has prioritised areas such as non-nuclear submarine capabilities, certain surface naval capabilities and long-range ship-to-ship missiles against carrier battle groups. Therefore, Russian submarines are generally considered to be very capable platforms if they are properly maintained. In Northern Europe, the use of Russian submarines to signal presence, reach and power goes far beyond the resource approach.
In large parts of the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea, NATO and its partner nations do not currently have the means to meet the Russian underwater challenge in the short term. This is not only due to diminishing capabilities, but equally problematic is the lack of integration between the relevant allies and partners. Effective submarine hunting capabilities require a joint alliance approach that integrates and coordinates national and NATO platforms, sensors and personnel. These integrated capabilities need to be underpinned by a coherent doctrine and exercised regularly to ensure real capability at both national and alliance level.
In view of competing priorities, tight defence budgets and interface problems in the European defence sector between NATO members and the important partner countries Sweden and Finland, organisational reforms coupled with a joint alliance approach to capability development and fine-tuning are needed to get the rebuilding of American and European submarine warfare capabilities underway. To counter Russian underwater activities, the study makes the following recommendations in the concluding chapter 4:
- Preparation of organisational structuresRelying exclusively on NATO structures could prove to be the wrong approach in terms of effectively utilising partner capabilities and expertise. Together with the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), NATO could act as a bridge to promote interoperability and the combined level of performance. A centre of excellence focused on submarine warfare could also be useful as a hub for research, planning, doctrine development, lessons learned and the rebuilding and integration of undersea warfare capabilities.
- Bringing skills up to dateTo develop a system that is effective against new and emerging technologies, NATO and its partners need to build a multi-domain, multi-platform and maritime surveillance complex, ideally in a joint alliance construct that prioritises payloads over platforms. The specific recommendations of this study bring together different sensors and strike capabilities based on small and large, manned and unmanned, space-based, airborne, surface and submarine platforms.
- Improve the overall postureNATO can optimise its overall submarine force posture to ensure the right capabilities are deployed in the right place at the right time when it reopens Kevlavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and encourages Norway to do the same with the Submarine Support Facility in Olavsvern.
The organisations, relationships, intelligence and capabilities that once made up the robust submarine hunting network in the North Atlantic and Baltic no longer exist. It represents a critical step in a joint alliance approach to meet the 21st century challenge posed by Russia's undersea forces in the region and to prevent Russian maritime coercion against the United States, NATO and key European partners."
In chapter 3 "Meeting the Russsian Challenge"The study analyses the strategic priorities of NATO and its partners, takes a detailed look at the capabilities of the countries (DAN, FRA, FIN, DEU, NDL, NOR, POL, SWE, GBR, USA) and uses tables to show the diminished potential of the individual navies. Germany is described as representative for Europe:
"The German Navy is representative of the ASW capabilities resident in several relevant European nations. For the past fifteen years, NATO has emphasised its operations in Afghanistan. In response, the German Navy moved away from investing in capabilities needed for territorial defence. Therefore, the latest class of German surface combatant, the F125-class, has little to no ASW capabilities.
This surface fleet shortfall is partially offset by the excellence of the German submarine fleet. The Type 212 submarines, the product of a joint development programme with Italy, are some of the most advanced air independent propulsion (AIP) submarines in the world. Their exceptional stealth, long submerged endurance, and small size makes them ideal for shallow water and littoral operations. While they would seemingly excel in Baltic Sea operations, it is unclear to what extent the German submarine force operates in these waters.
Notably, however, these vessels have no land attack capability. In fact, the German Navy does not possess any form of long-range land attack weapon for either surface or subsurface vessels. There are understandable political sensitivities around the acquisition of such capabilities by the German Navy. However, given the current security environment in Europe and beyond, a limited investment into these systems may be prudent."
Although the German U212A is considered one of the "most advanced AIP submarines in the world" is duly honoured, yet in the passage about Sweden, the A26 under construction receives the more important (advance) laurels for the study's concern when it says: "The new A26 vessels will be a step change in terms of multi-mission capability...The A26 will also use Stirling engines vice fuel cells, eliminate the day's long fueling process, and boast a flexible payload capacity..." This labels the German unique selling point "fuel cell AIP" as a disadvantage compared to the Swedish Stirling solution and conceals the fact that the fuel cell has an unsurpassed favourable acoustic signature, several times higher efficiency and a much smaller footprint.
Nevertheless, in this author's opinion, the study refrained from criticising German deficits and omitted, for example, the on-board helicopter plight. She correctly surmises that U212A "would seemingly excel in the Baltic Sea operations", but remains vague with the statement that "it is unclear to what extent the German submarine force operates in these waters". The fact that this former playground of the German submarine force will probably have to remain orphaned due to the lamentable lack of personnel and material in the force, which has been reduced from 24 to 6 units, is probably left unmentioned out of tact. The fact that U212A was reduced to the role of a pure torpedo carrier as a high-value submarine platform and does not have a "flexible payload capacity", especially not about missiles and certainly not about missiles for use on land (land attack), is indeed a remarkable deficit, which may have to do with the fact that German submarines are at best seen as tactical-operational, but not as strategic naval warfare assets. In contrast, almost all German export submarines were at least armed with the American Sub-Harpoon by their respective navies.
Fading out the land-attack-In the case of the RBS15 missile for the K130 corvette, which is capable (but not yet operational), the study states that "in fact the German Navy does not possess any form of long-range land attack weapon for either surface or subsurface vessels". The fact that Germany also considered it sufficient to soon remove its over 7,000 tonnes of Frigates class 125 with "little to no ASW capabilities" into service is not left unmentioned in the study, but it does not explicitly brand this unique selling point, which is also unique worldwide. Presumably due to a lack of corresponding input, however, the study fails to mention a further major coup in terms of German undersea warfare capabilities: LFTAS, the "Low Frequency Active Towed Array Sonar", which, after years of testing, was launched in 2008 at the Frigate the class 123 "Bayern" had successfully passed the operational capability test and achieved maximum detection ranges previously considered impossible, even against small conventional submarines. As part of the "Capability Adaptation" project F123", the navy was not in a position to equip this premium localisation tool due to other financial priorities. This class of ship, originally planned as a "submarine hunting frigate", will therefore remain a "submarine hunting torso" until its foreseeable end of life. The fact that the single LFTAS on the defence research vessel "Planet" continues to operate in cooperation with submarines and is doing excellent work in the further development of multistatic underwater detection should be mentioned here, but does not help the German Navy out of its submarine-hunting misery. The old navy saying proves true here too: "Everywhere you scratch, the blue cloth comes out.
Two recommendations from Chapter 4 of the study are worthy of note from the author's point of view:
"Recommendation: Integrate Interoperable Land Attack Weapons on all NATO and Partner Nations' Submarines
Several nations have been unwilling to integrate land attack cruise missiles into their naval force for political reasons. Given current gaps in precision-guided munitions across allied surface and subsurface fleets, NATO and Sweden should refit their submarine forces to be capable of employing Tomahawk (or equivalent) land attack weapons. Land attack capability should also be a key requirement for all future allied and partner submarines.
Desired effect: Allows submarines to strike targets with less counterforce risk than land-based systems, bringing powerful deterrent value."
As quoted above, the study shows understanding for Germany's "understandable political sensitivities around the acquisition of such capabilities by the German Navy". In addition to political sensitivities (as is currently the case with the defence minister's failed attempt to justify armed drones), the navy has notorious problems even allowing its submarines to operate missiles, let alone providing budget funds for them. This is evidenced by the development failure of the submarine-based IDAS missile, which has a modest range of 20 km and is capable of helicopter defence as well as limited action on land. Just thinking about Tomahawk is therefore probably on the mental index of naval and submarine officers.
"Recommendation: Institutionalise and Further Develop a Unified Submarine Command, Weapons, and Tactics Course
The UK's submarine pre-command school, colloquially known as 'Perisher' because of its high standards and associated high failure rate, is attended by officers from several NATO nations. NATO should develop a short-form Perisher-style course for allies and partners, perhaps within the context of the ASW COE. Due to equipment differences, this course would not supplant national training for commanders (especially those representing more advanced undersea navies), but it will help promote integration among NATO navies, improve that ability of the NATO submarine force to operate in a combined manner, alleviate some of the burden of maintaining a robust training pipeline for nations with small submarine forces, and create a common baseline among those countries with more nascent capabilities. A unified pre-command course will also be important as the navies of the various NATO member states acquire new undersea warfare capabilities."
If there were any doubts as to whether Germans were involved in this study, they have been wiped away with this passage, because there is no mention of the German Submarine Training Centre (AZU). Although not clouded by the legendary myth of the British "Perisher", it has been training submarine commander candidates from NATO and non-NATO states for many years and is in no way inferior to the "Perisher" in terms of quality and standards. Furthermore, because the British only maintain nuclear-powered submarines in their own navy, the author doubts that their training courses can be transferred 1:1 to conventional submarines.
In view of the fact that Germany, with its recognised expertise in naval border warfare, was awarded the contract for the stationing of the NATO "Centre of Excellence for Confined and Shallow Waters" (COE CSW), was a formidable opponent of the Warsaw Pact in the Baltic Sea during the Cold War and, despite all the reductions, is still one of the stronger navies in Northern Europe, it is surprising that it was not actively involved in this study. Was a corresponding enquiry rejected, was there no institute that was deemed worthy of contributing? If one assumes conspiracy, especially with regard to the Swedish industrial sponsor, one is tempted to suspect intent. In 2014, the Kiel-based submarine shipyard tkMS/HDW parted ways with its Swedish subsidiary Kockums in disagreement - the Swedish state pursued the separation with all its might, as it had the greatest interest in pushing ahead with the ailing A26 submarine project on a purely national basis without German dependencies. Saab was more than happy to take over the broken pieces of the traditional Kockums submarine shipyard and, above all, its highly qualified personnel. Following Germany's defeat in the Australian submarine competition and with a view to the competition for Norway's new submarines, which will be decided in the next two years, there are interests that are interested in weakening the current German world market leader in non-nuclear submarine construction - including its "parent navy" - might have been located. It is striking that the study claims in the section on the Netherlands "[they] may be partnering with Sweden on submarine development and production" and that Poland "may be looking at a Swedish designed vessel". Honi soit qui mal y pense...
English 
German
A small addendum to the previous discussion on Sweden:
SWE has also been announced for UDT ASIA 2017 from 17-18 January 2017 in Singapore with a contribution on the A 26 submarine class. Where is TKMS?
As a supplement to the penultimate paragraph of my article, here is a link to an interesting article in the online edition of "The Strategist" of the "Australian Strategic Policy Institute" (ASPI), which deals with the British submarine commander training "Perisher":
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/century-ultimate-test-royal-navy-perisher-command-course/
One aspect from the brief analysis by the unknown author should be singled out: Class 212 A submarines have no missile armament, although 62%s of the world submarine fleet have this armament. An unrivalled flaw! Now that the Seaspider, a torpedo for torpedo defence, is being tested, the 212 A is losing even more combat effectiveness. Even navies of the former Third World have submarines with missile armament. Could it be that Germany's non-participation in the study is also due to the fact that the German submarine weapon is of very little importance in the Alliance? I repeat the concluding remark of the author, who is unknown to me: Honi soit qui mal y pense.
Regarding the keyword "Seaspider" given by Morgan von Müller... On 22.08.16, a few days ago, there was an update about this anti-torpedo torpedo in the online edition of "Die Welt", which was probably based on a press release by ATLAS-Elektronik (AE):
https://beta.welt.de/wirtschaft/article157798874/SeaSpider-ist-der-erste-einsatzfaehige-Anti-Torpedo-Torpedo.html
Why U212A should "lose even more combat power" by testing the Seaspider is not clear to me. The government can make sure that "Seaspider" does not fall into the wrong hands if it is not in its own hands (see below)....
If this project, which was cancelled years ago by the German Navy as a "TAU hard kill" (due to subordinate priority and not provided with HH funds), actually rises again like a phoenix from the ashes as the "Seaspider", then this is solely thanks to AE. And should the Canadians and possibly also the Dutch and British actually equip their submarines and surface units with it, then the company is to be congratulated for "sticking with it" and the aforementioned countries for their concern for the protection of their high-value units. In Germany, everything and nothing but the best is being done to protect soldiers in Afghanistan and elsewhere on land (according to ministerial announcements), but a naval war - and even one involving submarines - is probably considered so unlikely that it was (and probably still is) believed that a promising development project to protect the U212A high-value unit against enemy torpedoes can be safely consigned to oblivion.
I include the request for a successful completion of the company project "Seaspider" in my night prayer...
Very nice reference to the study and pointed categorisation, nice controversial debate: that's how it should be.
A small interjection:
Many thanks to all those involved for this substantial discussion!
Authors of blog posts and comments can do this under a real name or a pseudonym - we attach great importance to the responsible handling of their identity on the part of the blog, but also among users!
@author: The waves that such contributions make may not always be recognisable at first glance. But we are confident that Meer Verstehen is definitely read...
Now I have to dish something out. In the mistaken assumption that this blog entry would trigger an outcry among the underwater warriors, I was looking forward to a passionate expert discussion among an extended circle of commentators. But apart from a handful, the more than 700 users of the website are probably all voyeurs - and this same handful always ride their hobbyhorses with their contributions, i.e. they stick to the programme of their pseudonyms (Fleet, Segler, U-869, Sperrwaffe); the only one who dances out of line is Jopp, who operates with a clear name, but who also has a recurring constant: America-bashing ...;-)))....The active naval sailors who have degenerated into pirate and tugboat hunters or UNIFIL patrolmen naturally have neither time nor interest in "understanding me" - but in my opinion they could not contribute anything either, because their knowledge acquired in the B course in the classic "warfare areas" - in this case sub-hunting or mine warfare - is hardly ever required and certainly not adequately practised. As the study so politely put it: "While they would seemingly excel in Baltic Sea operations, it is unclear to what extent the German submarine force operates in these waters."
Dear Sperrwaffe, by no means a lecturing tone! I am convinced of your high level of information because of your contributions. But perhaps others have that too! Sometimes it is the case that information at the highest level circulates in different circles that do not always communicate with each other. I assume that the decision to put NSM on the MKS instead of RSB 15 - in case Oslo "dives German" - is well placed. It may not have gone through the communication tubes yet! We will have clarity soon,
Fleet suspects
Dear Fleet. Thank you very much. I was in no way questioning the level of information (nor what you said about it). The "more" information (while preserving what can/may be told) is what makes the difference. I was concerned with the basic categorisation.
Otherwise we are in agreement.
Sperrwaffe: you are well informed in this blog! Assume that NSM is set for the FMD in case Oslo dives German!
Fleet is convinced
@Fleet: Instructive tone or specific hint?
There is certainly a high level of information here. That's why I'm here.
But please allow me a corresponding level of information. Even if my nickname might lead you to believe otherwise. I will be happy to let you know by e-mail if you have any doubts about my statements. Even if I have stayed away from the debate here for a long time. But I don't want to argue at all.
What I want to say is that I am happy to assume such things. But this also means communicating such things at some point.
Or to put it another way:
The last articles by Mr Sperber and Mr Braun on the subject of FMD summarise the current state of affairs quite well. If further certain system configurations are now to be defined as set, which have definitely not been in the documents so far, then it is time to slowly communicate this to those involved in the process on the client and bidder side. I don't know the timeline for Norwegian submarines in detail at the moment? I think MKS is much further ahead in the process. Does that ring a bell? In my opinion, this wait-and-see approach "in case Oslo dives German" is completely the wrong way to go. I want to set a certain FK? Then here you go. Let's go. A type representative is not a set system. There is still an opportunity to place this for all those involved in the project (which are 3 bidders, the Navy, Koblenz + WTDs and the BMVg) and not to ponder "what if".
You want to have abilities (ships, flagpoles, warfare areas that you can operate, you name it...) at the end, or just great-looking processes? Because time is far too scarce on all sides, which nobody really wants to admit.
Is it clearer now what I was getting at?
We hear U-869 very well! The political intention to win over Norway - especially after the Australian decision - is in Berlin. We hear that the German Navy is keen to join the Norwegian request to enable its submarines to combat land targets (with 2 boats). The Norwegian NSM is probably set for the MKS 180 (surface). This does not mean that it will also be considered for future submarines. The chances of a Norwegian submarine order are not bad, but it is by no means a done deal. The fact remains that it is only signed when everything is signed.
Let me put it this way:
Even if this is politically propagated and pursued with regard to NSM. Nothing has been officially finalised yet. For the time being, this is still under the coastal gossip threshold.
This is the kind of exchange of ideas you can expect from "meerverstehen"! As far as I know, the RBS-15 missile (scaffolded on the K 130) has now been qualified for land target engagement. It is rumoured on the coast that the Norwegian sea/land target FK NSM is intended for the MKS 180 procurement project. If a Norwegian submarine order is placed, the German Navy will reportedly join in with two boats, which - like the Norwegian boats - will then have a land target combat capability. The IDAS project, which gives the submarine a new capability, must not be forgotten,
summarises FLEET.
The contract for the Norwegian submarine project is far from being in the German order books.
On 11.03.16, the magazine Defence News ( http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2016/03/11/germany-norway-eye-joint-submarine-procurement/81652056/ ) that -
"Katrin Suder, German secretary of state for armament, said that a procurement of the naval strike missile (NSM) and the battle management system, both produced by Norway's Kongsberg, is 'conceivable'. The condition for such a deal, however, is a previous tender process. In case of a jointly developed product between Norway and Germany, this could be obtained without competition, the secretary of state said"
- but there is still a mountain of obstacles in the way!
If you believe the meerverstehen blog post, then the German Navy is not yet ready to equip its submarines with such a "big stick" - that will only work if the politicians decide to do so. However, I don't see the political will to do so! One technical problem is that the NSM has not yet been "submarinised", but Kongsberg is said to be working on it.
The biggest hurdle, however, is that DCNS from France, which was victorious in Australia, is once again competing with the Germans for the Norwegian submarine project. And the French, together with Thales, play in the premier league when it comes to missiles. Although they already have their own submarine-based cruise missile, "Scalp", they have nevertheless made the Norwegians a tempting offer. Griephan 21/16 from 23/05/16 reported on this:
"France, on the other hand, seems to be using the momentum from Canberra and is offering Kongsberg to use the [NSM] missile in future as a Joint Strike Missile for French fighter aircraft and as a Naval Strike Missile for surface and submarine platforms."
Loyalty to Germany's decades-long submarine armaments partner alone will not be enough to outdo the French in Norway. A concerted national approach is required. Griephan called this "Le Mannschaft" in the above-mentioned issue...
Thank you for this good summary. Briefly on the Russian submarines: It is well known here that they suffer from considerable logistical difficulties and even the latest SSNs are only kept in service by cannibalisation.
This study is another attempt to allocate budget funds to the Navy in the USA.
The comment on Sweden can only be emphasised. However, publishing essays in English is more helpful here than trying to spread negative propaganda. This problem is not new. A change of course would be desirable.
The Swedes have a textbook understanding of how to utilise a renowned US think tank and "frame the mindset" in the classic manner to the detriment of competitors. Joining forces with the Americans in this way is cleverer than publishing English-language essays - although that doesn't hurt, of course. The German industry should take a closer look at why it prevailed in Singapore's submarine newbuilding project against the established Swedes there. After reading the blog post, I have the feeling that the Swedes are in the process of implementing the "lessons learnt" from this defeat. They are sponsoring and thus influencing the statements of the CSIS study to the detriment of the Germans....
Sorry, but the blog was about a CSIS study with the support of the USNI. The whole thing was also advertised worldwide via the social network LinkedIn and via CIMSEC. In my view, this is more than just Swedish marketing. We need to play the piano of thought, politics and economics in a coordinated way. International studies are being carried out on requests for possible contributions. Are we participating?
You are probably right, I have probably gone a little too far with my conspiracy assumptions and the study can by no means be reduced to "Swedish marketing". Especially as the reader also learns in the acknowledgements that "the team is deeply appreciative of Saab's respect for our intellectual independence". In any case, you should read the study - here is the link to download the PDF file:
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf
However, I still think that my speculations cannot be completely dismissed, considering that a sponsor not only gives money, but - despite the above-mentioned "Declaration of Independence" - also influences the content, provides interview experts [e.g. preferably Swedish], pays for their business trips, etc. As can be read in the blog, it was noticeable that the study only mentions Swedish designs as being considered for both the Dutch and Polish submarine successor programmes. When reading the study, I also noticed that the passage about Norway makes no mention of a submarine project at all! Perhaps because only the French and Germans are on the shortlist and the Swedes were excluded?
Note and recommendation:
CSIS has recently added a video to its website in which the team presents the study, followed by a panel discussion:
https://www.csis.org/events/undersea-warfare-northern-europe
Last but not least, I am of the opinion:
Above all the submarine discussions, it should not be overlooked what the actual message of the study is: "The Alliance's Undersea Warfare Capability is in bad shape" - and the German Navy should not gloss over its share of the deficits, but start doing its homework.
Defence News is now reporting that the Poles have opted for Saab's new A-26 submarine, against tkMS and DCNS, quantity 3, contract volume 2.6 billion USD...
Somehow my previous post to the above article got lost with the last update (and the new mail to it), but is still displayed in the "last posts" column...
Unfortunately we had some formatting and software problems with the last publication, I apologise that your comment could not be displayed in the revised article!
Many thanks for the feedback. I had already thought something like that.
Let's see if I can get the tenor of my thoughts together again.
The study is indeed interesting and I agree with the comments above (the discussion between Mr Jopp and U-869 below also raises good points). However, I find the study's pure focus on ASW somewhat disturbing. The topic of underwater naval warfare is now somewhat more extensive and without including the mine component you will quickly run into problems. Both areas, ASW and MW, should be considered together as a common problem. After all, they are both rooted in the complexity of the underwater situation. It is not for nothing that ASW is humorously referred to as "Awfully Slow Warfare". And this has not and will not change in the distant future. And the same applies to MW. In this respect, both topics belong together in my opinion. This view would also sometimes take away some of the displacement effects that always take place between them.
The call for a COE ASW sounds plausible at first. However, judging by my favoured perspective, it would probably lead to another "battle of the elements for significance" in the long term. At present, I would prefer to see a deepening and consolidation of the topics in the existing maritime COEs in the NATO network, for example. I would initially see CJOS, CSW and MW in this role. If so, I would prefer the creation of an Undersea Warfare COE which could then manage the sub-elements. COE MW could also remain in this construct (the Eastern ABNL representatives would not give it up anyway...)...).
These were roughly the first thoughts, which have now been expanded somewhat with a few days in between.
In addition to the topic of MW is part of it. This is where I see the fundamental weakness in the US Navy's thinking. They have hardly learnt from their experiences after the Gulf War in 1991, when they needed the minesweepers of their allies in the Persian Gulf. The much-praised new MW module for the LCS is, as we all know, a flop. They are starting all over again. I find a statement by Peter Swartz in his extensive contribution to the Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security so apt, where he states about MW: "Because America's allies often have superb mine countermeasures capabilities, in coalition operations the U.S. Navy often cedes much of the responsibility for this warfare area to them."
This is the weakness of the study. With a view to the Baltic Sea, shouldn't we organise an exercise at the Bw Command and Staff College, where mine warfare plays a significant role? We would have the advantage of being able to involve participants from all Baltic Sea neighbouring countries. A presentation of the results to leading naval officers from the Baltic Sea countries could be very helpful.
You are absolutely right, mine warfare is part of undersea warfare! The CSIS team probably had no interest and/or expertise to include MW (also considered "not sexy" in the USA) and failed to at least narrow it down accordingly.
@heinzdieterjopp
Definitely an interesting idea. But then please involve the FB Mine at the MOS, EF1 and WTD and not solely on a FüAk basis. Use the expertise in-house and not bypass it...
Even if the contributions are out of sequence: My proposal for the FüAk was based on the presence of foreign naval officers in the course, the possibility of computer-based exercises and the possible participation of other TSK members. The suggestion to include naval expertise from MOS and EF 1 is correct and their participation would be ideal. From here on, FA Schneider and KzS Straus are called upon as possible initiators.