Questions for German security policy

For some time now, questions about German foreign and security policy have been piling up that need to be answered after the Bundestag elections. The COVID pandemic, the flood disaster in western Germany and, most recently, the evacuation from Afghanistan have shown that the Federal Republic of Germany's ability to act has reached its limits time and time again. These crises not only affect our external security, but also many areas of politics and society.

The question arises as to whether the system of government needs to be fundamentally adapted. Do we again need a constitutional reform commission of enquiry, as in the 1970s, to draw up recommendations for such a reform on a broad parliamentary and social basis?

We have summarised some of the most pressing questions in the event that politicians dare to engage in such fundamental considerations after the election.

Foreign policy

• Where has Germany moved in the alliances since 1990? Does "never again war" still apply, supplemented by "never again alone", or to put it another way:
• Is Germany still firmly part of the Western alliance, or has it become somewhat detached from it and manoeuvred into a triangle between the West, China and Russia?
• And in this context: what is a fundamental assessment of the relationship with China in view of its changed policy under Xi Jinping?
• How does Germany see its role with regard to its eastern partners? Is it the backbone of Europe's conventional defence capability or does it see itself primarily as a mediator between the West and Russia, which relies equally on understanding for both sides?
• How does Germany position itself in the debate on so-called European autonomy in security and defence policy? Does it understand this to mean a strengthened European pillar of NATO that is capable of small and medium-sized operations without the USA if necessary, or is it primarily about autonomy from the USA?
• Is Germany prepared to formulate and publish a national security strategy?

Europe and the economy

• Does Germany see itself, as in the past, as the spokesperson for the market-liberal states of the EU, geared towards resolving contentious issues bilaterally in advance with France as the representative of a more statist group in order to jointly represent the result in the EU?
• Or is it orientating itself towards a middle position, knowing that after the UK's departure it will be the only major country in the liberal economic group and will therefore no longer be able to assert its former positions?
• This leads directly to the question of whether Germany will continue to insist on a stability-orientated financial policy within the EU, or whether it will accommodate the desire of the southern members in particular to pursue a softer euro policy?
• Will Germany continue to rely on its export strength, which is very much based on moderate production costs at home and is constantly criticised by less export-strong partners, or is there room for adjustment?

Security and armed forces

• Do we create a national crisis centre with decision-making powers that can decide and act quickly in challenging situations such as those mentioned above?
• Is the constitutional basis still sufficient for appropriate participation in the alliance? Can we live with the fact that Russia and China have a de facto right of veto over our foreign policy in the United Nations Security Council?
• Are we prepared to learn from Bundeswehr deployments abroad and to conduct an open security policy debate to this end?
• What needs to be done to adapt the structure of the armed forces in such a way that procurement and operations are once again possible in cooperation between the armed forces and the administration?

The open handling of military issues will be an initial litmus test of the extent to which the next Federal Government is prepared to tackle security issues in a fundamentally different way to its predecessor or whether it will retain its usual method of moderating such uncomfortable debates.