Russian warships in the keel line

Russian warships in the keel line

Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet - an impossible divorce

The naval base of Sevastopol on the south-western tip of Crimea has been the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet since the 18th century. This fleet is part of the former Imperial Russian Navy, or the Soviet naval fleet until 1991, and since then the naval forces of the Russian Federation. Although it is the smallest of the four fleets in the Russian sphere of influence and has no nuclear significance (it has been disarmed since the early 1990s), it is Russia's strategic arm towards the Mediterranean. The vast majority of its units are stationed in Sevastopol; other harbours in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are not suitable as bases for larger or multiple units. From this base, it operates as far as the Mediterranean - for a few years now also with the Tartus base on the Syrian coast. The special status of the city of Sevastopol at a central location in the Black Sea and at the same time as the home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet runs like a red thread through the history of the region.

When the individual Soviet republics were granted independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was created with Crimea as an independent territory. For whatever reason, a serious mistake was made: the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol also belonged to Crimea. What had previously been an impossibility with centralised control of the Soviet Union from Moscow and could therefore perhaps not have been seen - possibly also due to ignorance of the maritime interests of this colossal land power - suddenly became a reality: Russia was in danger of losing control of roughly a quarter of its global naval power!

The "fraternal" use of the Sevastopol naval base by both the Russian and Ukrainian navies, which was agreed in good faith or inexperience, repeatedly led to severe irritation in relations between the two states. The impossibility of creating clear relations in the binational situation in twenty years meant that Crimea and Sevastopol could not find peace. At the same time, the financial weakness of both countries in the post-Soviet period caused the obsolete ships of the torn Black Sea Fleet to deteriorate into scrap.

Although the Black Sea Fleet is still the smallest fleet in the Russian Navy, it has undergone a considerable overhaul in recent years with the arrival of new ship classes such as the three Grigorovich frigates, the six Bykov corvettes, the three Buyan patrol vessels and the six Kilo III submarines. The armament with land-based Kalibr cruise missiles should not be overlooked: These units - including the appropriately equipped units in the Caspian Sea - have already been involved in shelling Syrian cities! And now the shelling of Ukraine, where it can be assumed that these land-based cruise missiles will also be used against the south of Ukraine from the sea.

Sevastopol - a post-Soviet disaster

The history of the city of Sevastopol naturally begins long before the end of the Second World War, but we will deliberately only look at the post-war history here.

The harbour of Sevastopol

Pivdenna Bay in the harbour of Sevastopol, looking north towards the state university.

In 1954 - one year after the end of the Stalin era - under the government of Nikita Khrushchev, the Crimean peninsula and therefore also the harbour city of Sevastopol were removed from the direct administration of the Russian SSR (Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and transferred to the Ukrainian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic). This had little military significance for the Black Sea Fleet, as it continued to be managed by the Ministry of Defence, as all important matters were decided in Moscow at the time anyway. And the Sevastopol base - as well as almost the entire city - was under the direct control of the naval command.

General situation 1992 to 1995

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the independence of Ukraine, the Russian Federation lost its direct claim to many bases on the Black Sea, which were now located on Ukrainian territory, and above all to Sevastopol as the home port of the traditional Black Sea Fleet. Its ships were to be divided up by negotiation between Russia and the now independent Ukraine - a quick and possibly easy decision in Moscow, but one that must have been taken without due consideration of Russia's important maritime interests in terms of security policy. This situation must have been unbearable for the Russian Federation's navy, as a sufficiently large base is essential to guarantee maritime protection of the southern Black Sea-Mediterranean flank. What followed was a gruelling period of "fraternal strife" over the sovereignty, jurisdiction and responsibility for the city of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet.

The ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian navy, which were alongside each other at the time, could only be distinguished from each other by the fact that the ship number of the Ukrainian ships began with a capital Latin "U" and a Ukrainian naval flag was flown. Due to the chaotic economic and financial situation, both Russia and Ukraine initially had considerable difficulties in ensuring the combat readiness of their ships. There were massive irritations, which only eased with the 1997 naval treaty and a clear regulation on the division of the fleet and the whereabouts of the Russian navy in Crimea until 2017. This treaty was extended in 2010 until 2042 in return for cheaper gas supplies. It was not until the annexation of Crimea in 2014 that there was a final break and the material and territorial separation of the two navies.

Five years in detail

At the beginning of 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk placed all former Soviet troops stationed on Ukrainian territory, including the Black Sea Fleet, under Ukrainian supreme command, with the exception of strategic units (nuclear weapons and associated troops). In April 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin immediately placed the Black Sea Fleet under Russian control and called for negotiations. Four months later, an agreement was reached in the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet on a transitional joint supreme command of the two states over the approximately 380 ships and boats until 1995.

However, the problem of a disintegrating fleet under the command of two unequal masters with conflicting interests, but in the same place, could not be solved so easily. So ten months later, the two statesmen signed another agreement, according to which the fleet's 300 or so ships and boats as well as buildings and harbour facilities would each be divided in half within 24 months, but would continue to be jointly managed, financed and placed under the joint supreme command of both presidents.

What had not worked before could not be cured: After just two months, this agreement on the Black Sea Fleet had to be revised (September 1993). Ukraine - as the "official sole heir", so to speak, to Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet - now agreed to the sale of a 50% share of the "floating substance" to Russia. The Sevastopol naval base on Ukrainian territory will be leased to Russia. The lease payments of a "symbolic" 100 million dollars per annum are to be offset against Ukraine's oil and gas debts to the lessee. All in all, this is not an appropriate arrangement for Russia to maintain "its" Black Sea fleet.

This led to renewed negotiations barely six months later (April 1994). Ukraine sold an additional two thirds of its half of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia, leaving the Ukrainian naval forces with around 60 units, mainly in Sevastopol, and a few unfinished hulls in the surrounding shipyards - generally in poor condition and barely seaworthy or unseaworthy. Sevastopol continued to be partially leased but jointly utilised.

Consequently, Russia, with its clear majority of units in Sevastopol, demanded the sole right to use the naval base, which is why an additional agreement was negotiated a year later (June 1995). Although it was still agreed that the harbour city would remain a base for the Russian navy and that the military infrastructure in Crimea could be used by Russia, there was a clear separation of the fleet. The former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which at the time had around 48,000 soldiers under its command and had 31 surface combatants, 14 submarines, 43 patrol and coastal defence boats, 125 combat aircraft and 85 helicopters as its main combat forces, was formally divided up: Russia received 81.7 % and Ukraine 18.3 % of the units. The key was simple: the good ones (roadworthy) under the tricolour, the bad ones (scrappy) and the environmental burdens under the blue-yellow bicolour! The joint control of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet by Russia and Ukraine was to formally end on 31 December 1995. The wheel just turned one spoke further without giving Sevastopol a concrete direction.

As expected, however, this was by no means the end of the story: in May 1997, after five years of joint wrangling, Yeltsin and Kuchma signed another agreement on the status of the fleet, the Russian-Ukrainian Naval Treaty. Russia now leased the military facilities in Sevastopol for the next 20 years, but the bases in Sevastopol (Pivdenna Bay, Karantinnaya Bay) and the facilities in Streletskaya (Nakhimov Naval Academy) remained in joint use with the Ukrainian navy. Following ratification by the parliaments of both states, the agreement only came into force on 12 July 1999.

This was followed by Viktor Yushchenko's terms in office as Western-oriented Prime Minister and President of Ukraine, during which the Russian Black Sea Fleet repeatedly became a rhetorical target of the Ukrainian leadership. In April 2010, his more Russian-orientated successor, Viktor Yanukovych, reached an agreement with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to extend the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet for a further 25 years after the previous contract expired in 2017. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was to remain stationed in Crimea relatively free of charge until 2042. In return, Ukraine received a 30% price reduction for Russian natural gas - which had previously been massively increased in price. The Russian and Ukrainian parliaments approved the agreement on 27 April 2010. There were brawls in the Ukrainian parliament during the session; opposition politicians threw smoke bombs.

Was Russia perhaps looking to untie the Gordian knot when it instigated the Crimean crisis in February 2014, as a result of which the Autonomous Republic of Crimea declared its independence on 11 March and subsequently applied to join the Russian Federation? Russia complied with this request and the Federation Council ratified the treaty on 21 March 2014 - a well-orchestrated annexation whose legitimacy under international law is controversial, to say the least. In any case, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation officially took military control of Crimea on 22 March 2014. In total, over 147 Ukrainian military facilities on the peninsula were brought under Russian control. Sevastopol as a naval base was no longer a problem!

The Russian Black Sea Fleet initially took over 54 of a total of 67 ships from the Ukrainian naval forces in Crimea. On 3 April 2014, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that the Ukrainian military equipment, including the ships, would be returned to Ukraine. From the middle of the month, six units set course for Odessa, including the Krivak-class flagship, a Grisha-class submarine hunter and auxiliary vessels such as tugs and tankers. Three more supply ships followed at the beginning of June. Although the return was supposed to be completed by the end of 2014, the process was suspended at the beginning of July due to the situation in eastern Ukraine and has not been resumed to date. According to Russian information, a total of 43 out of 79 warships, all vehicles and some of the aeroplanes and helicopters have been returned to Ukraine. However, "warships" is an exaggeration: Hardly any of them were less than 30 to 40 years old, the majority of them rusting away unperturbed in Sevastopol! The six to eight units mentioned above have made up the bulk of the Ukrainian navy in recent years - apart from smaller units of less than 100 tonnes.

Black Sea Fleet in the harbour of Sevastopol, 2014; Photo: wiki

Looking back from today's perspective

As the home port of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol was a closed city until 1991, and residents of the surrounding area could only enter with a pass. The city was under the direct control of the Ukrainian central government in Kiev and not the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. From 1994, the city was first opened to Crimean residents and later to the rest of Ukraine and foreign tourists.

Despite Sevastopol being part of Ukraine, the Russian naval command and pro-Russian authorities/organisations dominated economic, social and cultural life in the port city, and not only through the lease agreements. Even with these subliminal activities in the Russian-descended parts of the population, Moscow specifically supported its own strategic endeavours for Crimea's independence from Ukraine.

Was it only a logical consequence that Russia, as the centrepiece of the Russian Federation, had to "regain" complete sovereignty first over the port city of Sevastopol, then Crimea by means of annexation - and not enough - also over a land-based access corridor to the peninsula by means of armed conflict? Should the Crimean crisis of 2014, the separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and ultimately the invasion of Ukraine as a whole be seen as the result of a - supposedly or not - hasty, land-minded division into independent states without taking into account strategic aspects of maintaining maritime power and the self-image of the Russian navy? A semi-silken and unwritten procedural regulation for Sevastopol or even the idea of a voluntary renunciation of the Black Sea Fleet could not have found a single supporter in naval circles when the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union began to take shape in the spring of 1991.

Was the inseparability of the Black Sea Fleet and the Sevastopol base not recognisable in the shock of the separation of Ukrtaine and Russia? Or was it simply not important? Did the Russian navy perhaps not have sufficient influence in Moscow or the necessary weight in relation to the land and air forces of the giant empire? Had the maritime concerns not been audibly articulated? Late realisation as a reason for war? As a small part of Putin's overall picture, this is probably how it should be assessed.

Looking ahead

Depending on the outcome of Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine, two questions will arise:

1) Should Putin fail and have to withdraw his forces, including from Crimea, then we need to think about how much space the Black Sea Fleet should be given and where it should find an adequate home. Because the core problem of the "geostrategic fleet and its naval base" must not be ignored again.

2) If 50%s of the Black Sea coast ultimately fall into Putin's hands, then the Russian Black Sea Fleet - even after losses from combat operations - will represent a considerable, one-sided preponderance of forces in the Black Sea, which cannot be compensated for by the naval forces of the NATO states on the ground. Even if they represent the other half of the coastline, there is not much in the way of combat capability. This raises the question of what additional NATO maritime presence will be required in this sea area - and what practical options the Montreux Convention still leaves Turkey as a NATO state without wanting to change it on a grand scale. But how much consideration should be given to Russia if it does not feel bound by elementary treaties?

Sources: Wikipedia, own research

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