Israel has been fighting its enemies in the region on a massive scale for almost a year and a half. What are the consequences of the fighting for the German Armed Forces and Navy?

Hamas' attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 has escalated into a war that has shaken the region. Israel has not only fought in the Gaza Strip, but also in Lebanon. There have also been isolated strikes against Iran and Yemen. The Houthi rebels in Yemen have been attacking ships in the Red Sea for more than a year. Now that ceasefires are in place in Lebanon and Gaza, an initial analysis can be made.

After 7 October, the Israeli army first had to drive Hamas fighters out of the border area with the Gaza Strip before the Israeli counter-offensive began. A number of buildings were destroyed by air strikes and artillery, and The fighting on the ground caused many casualties among the civilian population. In military terms, however, the fighting was successful. At the end of October 2024, it was estimated that Hamas had lost around 30,000 fighters through death, injury or capture. Of the approximately 35,000 fighters at the beginning of the war, only 5,000 remained. At the same time, there were increasing reports that supplies of weapons and ammunition were running low. Despite these losses, the ideology of Hamas has not disappeared.

Lebanese Hezbollah was also taken by surprise by Hamas' attack on Israel. It initially responded with a purely symbolic attack on the remote Shebaa Farms, but over the following weeks it intensified its shelling of Israel. The situation escalated and around 70,000 Israelis were evacuated from the north. Members of the German Navy at the Unifil headquarters in Naqura suddenly found themselves in the middle of a land war. Until September 2024, the situation was characterised by exchanges of fire with artillery and rockets, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Israeli air strikes. From the summer of 2024, Israel attacked targets throughout the country. On 17 September 2024, thousands of pagers detonated in Lebanon, which were used by members of Hezbollah and its allies. Israel has since claimed responsibility for the attack. The following day, Hezbollah radios were detonated. In total, around 40 people were killed and almost 4,000 wounded on these two days. With this strike, Israel hit the entire leadership as well as Hezbollah personnel "close to the leadership". At the same time, the Israeli air force intensified its attacks throughout the country and flew around 1600 strikes on 23 September alone. Just four days later, Israel destroyed the underground headquarters of Hezbollah in southern Beirut, killing the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.

The offensive by Israeli ground troops began on 1 October, with both sides firing on Unifil positions several times. As in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli advance was rather slow and systematic, with Hezbollah putting up stubborn resistance. Around three weeks after the start of the ground offensive, Hezbollah was considered to have been badly hit, if not defeated. By the end of October, the immediate border region had been cleared of Hezbollah fighters to a depth of five to six kilometres. At the beginning of November, the number of Hezbollah fighters killed was put at around 3,000. Of these, around 2000 have been killed since the start of the ground offensive, while around 1000 are said to have died in the previous twelve months. During the ground offensive, the Israeli army deliberately restricted itself to a narrow strip along the border. On the one hand, this was due to political reasons such as international resistance. On the other hand, the necessary deployment of forces on the Israeli side may have seemed too great for more intensive action against the stubbornly defending Hezbollah, as the army had already been fighting for a year.

A ceasefire finally came into force on the morning of 26 November 2024. This essentially provides for the implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which in simple terms allows "no Hezbollah south of the Litani River". Israeli ground troops had to withdraw from Lebanon by 25 January 2025. Both sides honoured the ceasefire, although there were individual incidents.

Unexpectedly and within a very short space of time, the regime of Syrian President Assad fell at the beginning of December. It was of great importance for the future of Hezbollah due to the establishment of a land bridge and areas of retreat. In addition, Iran's position in the region and Russia's presence in the Mediterranean depended on the Assad regime. Israel indirectly brought about this development by binding the fighters and weakening Hezbollah.

In "solidarity with the Palestinians", the Houthi rebels attacked international shipping in the region from November 2023. Since then, they have carried out around 250 attacks and used around 600 anti-ship missiles, ballistic missiles, drones and unmanned explosive boats. More than 40 ships have been hit, although most of them suffered only minor damage. Three ships suffered serious damage, two of which sank. Over time, the attacks became more complex. For example, on 11 November last year, the Houthi rebels attacked the American destroyers Spruance and Stockdale with a total of eight UAVs, five ballistic missiles and three sea-target FKs. All weapons were repelled and no one on the US side was injured.

To counter the attacks by the Houthi rebels, the USA launched Operation Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the EU launched the Aspides mission, in which the German Navy participated with the frigate Hessen. Like almost all warships in the region, the Hessen was involved in several battles. There were difficulties in defending against air targets, the SM-2 missile did not hit, which was attributed to a technical defect in the fire control system. According to the navy, the fault has been rectified. Incidentally, other navies experienced similar problems. It turns out that various air defence systems on board warships had difficulties hitting their targets under real-life conditions.

A technical peculiarity of the conflict in the Red Sea is the use of ballistic missiles, which appear to have at least limited manoeuvrability, against ships at sea.
In August 2024, credible reports appeared according to which Russia wanted to supply the Houthi Yakhont sea-skimming missile with a range of 300 kilometres and a speed of 2500 kilometres per hour. However, at the request of Saudi Arabia, this is said to have been cancelled. At the end of October 2024, it was then reported that Russia had supported the Houthis with "satellite data". This was often translated as "satellite images" in the German media. Since ships move, reconnaissance of ships at sea using satellite images is often unsuccessful. The situation is quite different when satellites are used to detect the emissions of ships. Radar, radio and satellite communication can then be used for reconnaissance. This allows ships to be identified and a large-scale situation picture to be created. It would also be possible for them to record and pass on communication content. Whether emails from harbour authorities and ship agents or poorly secured communications from military agencies, Russia can tell the Houthis a lot of things that they would otherwise not know. In return, Russia can learn something about the strengths and weaknesses of Western air defences from the attacks. China is also said to have supplied the Houthis with weapons and parts for the construction of missiles and UAVs. In October 2024, several Chinese companies were named and sanctioned by the USA as a result.
The Houthi rebels have allegedly found a way to collect fees from shipping companies in return for free passage. According to the report, the income from this source amounts to 180 million dollars per month. This would mean that the payments would be half the monthly revenue of the Suez Canal - although experts doubt this. Nevertheless, if the Houthi rebels are collecting some kind of protection money, this would be a remarkable development.

A special feature of the current conflict is that Israel and Iran have attacked each other directly for the first time. In retaliation for an Israeli attack on an Iranian embassy building in Damascus, Iran attacked the Jewish state with 170 UAVs, 30 cruise missiles and 120 ballistic missiles on 17 April. Following the attack on the Hezbollah headquarters on 27 September, Iran attacked Israel again on 1 October with around 200 ballistic missiles. Israel was able to fend off both attacks with the support of its partners. In response to these attacks, Israel flew two attacks against targets in Iran for the first time. In the second Israeli attack on 26 October, the modern S-300 radar systems of the Iranian air defence system in the west of the country, as well as production facilities for UAVs and ballistic missiles and a nuclear programme facility, were destroyed.

More successful than expected

What began as a hand-to-hand assault, mainly on foot, has now become a regional war that has brought about epochal changes. The operations of the Israeli armed forces in the Gaza Strip were successful, as Hamas appears to have been crushed as an organised military force. Not only were many buildings destroyed, but there were also numerous civilian casualties, although their number was probably lower than the media close to Hamas would have us believe. As a consequence of Israel's actions, the remaining hostages were only gradually released after a ceasefire agreement came into force. Although Israel was heavily criticised internationally for its actions, Hamas' calculations did not work out. Iran and Hezbollah were not prepared to risk a full-scale escalation with Israel.
In military terms, Israel's operations in Lebanon were also much more successful than expected. By the end of October 2024, Hezbollah was severely defeated. The attack with pagers and radios will probably go down in the history of warfare as an outstanding operation. The amount of explosives used by Israel was only roughly equivalent to the amount of explosives used in two 155 millimetre calibre grenades. This small amount paralysed the Hezbollah leadership, at least temporarily. Hezbollah's original doctrine ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth") was overcome by Israel. The country had the means to inflict significantly higher losses on Hezbollah than vice versa.

By establishing the buffer zone, the Israeli army has achieved its tactical goals. But whether it has also achieved its political goals is questionable. The Hezbollah fighters live in southern Lebanon and will return. They still have stand-off weapons, even if around 80 per cent of them have been destroyed. Hezbollah is still better able to bear casualties politically and socially than Israel.

However, it is also true that Hezbollah has lost support in recent years. Through its involvement in the war in Syria, Hezbollah has lost many good men, a lot of money and, above all, a lot of sympathy in the region. As a result, Hezbollah had difficulties recruiting personnel. It also became more susceptible to infiltration by Israeli intelligence. To put it simply, Hezbollah's combat value appears to be lower today than it was during the battles in 2006.

The fall of Assad is the most far-reaching consequence of the war. As a result, the Shiite land bridge collapsed and Hezbollah's supplies have been severely disrupted ever since. In addition, the permanent presence of the Russian navy in Tartus appears to have ended. Initially, the new rulers refused to evacuate the Russian equipment from Tartus. On 21 January 2025, the Russian cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II were allowed to enter the port and the evacuation of Russian equipment began. At the same time, the new rulers announced that they were cancelling the agreement on the use of the port by Russia.

An assessment of the situation in Yemen is mixed. The Houthi rebels attacked warships for the first time in October 2016 and have greatly developed their capabilities since then. This took place before the eyes of the world and was also analysed by the author in issue 5-2019 of marineforum. Today, the Huthi are capable of resisting the world's most important naval forces.

At present, the damage to commercial shipping is being minimised by avoiding the region. So far, only a few ships have been hit and an even smaller number damaged. From this perspective, the problem could therefore be considered minor. However, it is also a question of assessing the military success of the Western operations. Defence against the weapons used by the Houthi rebels proved to be difficult in some cases and costly overall. Furthermore, if it were possible to increase the hit rate of the ballistic missiles, this would have a major impact on surface warfare. Moreover, there is no end to the threat in sight. The Houthi rebels are clearly not running out of weapons, and their will to fight seems unchanged.

Number of weapons used by the USA and their cost

As a result, the importance of the Houthi rebels has increased noticeably. According to a United Nations report, they have developed from a regionally active rebel group into a powerful military player with the help of Iran and its allies.

Russia's support for the Houthi rebels is also significant. Although the delivery of the Yakhont missiles was prevented in the short term, Russia is presumably transmitting the results of its highly developed reconnaissance instead, which is also less conspicuous. At the same time, Russia is likely to learn something about the capabilities of Western missile defence. As a result, the full spectrum of Russian capabilities can now be expected to be found anywhere in the world. In other words, pirates and the Taliban used to be unable to read secret mails, but today Houthis and Hezbollah may be able to do so with Russian help.

In the direct battle between Iran and Israel, the assessment is clear. While the first Israeli airstrike against Iran was more of a demonstration of its own capabilities, the attack on 27 October had far-reaching consequences and can be considered a great success. Israel destroyed an important part of Iran's air defence and proved that it could overcome it. In addition, the production of fuel for solid-fuel engines for ballistic missiles and anti-ship missiles was permanently disrupted. The effectiveness of the two Iranian attacks on Israel was low in comparison. Israeli defences and those of its partners were jointly able to intercept the mass of the missiles.

Operational readiness required

Germany's postulated focus on national and alliance defence after the invasion of Ukraine came under pressure a year and a half after it was formulated. The era of foreign missions is therefore not over, despite the focus on the eastern flank. The Bundeswehr prepared for an evacuation operation from Lebanon and the navy deployed to Aspides. In addition, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock declared that she could envisage the Bundeswehr being deployed as a peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip. And a withdrawal of Unifil is currently very unlikely. It remains true that these deployments can be dangerous. During a peacekeeping mission, soldiers can unexpectedly find themselves in a combat situation that resembles a national defence scenario. This can be seen in both Unifil and Aspides. Physical fitness, mental toughness and operational readiness are therefore still required. On 15 February 2025, Hezbollah supporters attacked a Unifil convoy. The deputy commander was injured and a vehicle was set on fire. The background to the attack was a threat by Israel to shoot down commercial aircraft from Iran if they flew to Beirut. This attack shows what challenges the Unifil mission faces if it really wants to fulfil its mandate.

Only those who are ready for action should go to Naqura, as they may have to withstand fire there. And only ships that are fully operational should go to Aspides, because they have to expect an intense battle at any time. Especially as Russia is now happy to support Germany's opponents with high-quality capabilities. German armed forces must therefore expect Russian systems to be deployed worldwide.

Naval operations will soon be conducted from Rostock and no longer from Potsdam. This means that the situation described here will soon have direct consequences for the work of the naval command. The situation in the region will hardly calm down in the coming weeks and months. Although the ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon are currently still holding, the new US administration is made up of people who are known for their tough stance towards Iran. It is hardly surprising that analyses about the Middle East will probably continue to be published in marineforum.

Captain Sebastian Hamann is a member of the Cyber and Information Space Command.