On 8 April, Joseph Borrell and ASPIDES OpCdr RADM Vasileios Gryparis attended a press conference to provide an update on activities to restore maritime safety and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. (Photo: Aspides)
68 ships were protected - ten drones and four missiles were destroyed in eleven attacks
With Operation Aspides, the EU wants to protect merchant ships from attacks by Yemeni Huthi militiamen. According to High Representative Josep Borrell, 68 ships have been protected since 23 February and eleven attacks in the Red Sea have been repelled. At the specially convened press conference on 8 April, he expressed his satisfaction with the result that the EU is proving to be a maritime security guarantor. Especially in view of the fact that four EU ships are currently involved in the "purely defensive operation", as Borrell emphasised several times, to secure maritime traffic (mission component 1 of the operation) and protect ships and the lives of seafarers (mission component 2), he considers this a success. Not to mention the rapid realisation.
The commander of the operation, Greek Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, reported that nine aerial drones, one surface drone and three ballistic missiles had been intercepted during the seven weeks of the operation. Germany, France, Greece and Italy are currently each providing a ship with a total of more than 800 crew members. A total of nineteen member states are supporting the operation. He did not appear to be entirely happy about the deployment of armed forces. When asked, he explained that it had been possible to cover all of the requests for support so far. Should the volume change, then 'we might have to increase the number of platforms'. At this point, it should be remembered that the daily transits through the Suez Canal have halved from the previous 70 (before 19 October, the day of the first Houthi incursion) to the current 35. The Greek admiral's statement suggests that increasing the number of escorts would pose a challenge for the EU.
The narrower operational area is limited to a so-called high-risk zone, the southern part of the Red Sea, in order to conserve resources. An expansion beyond the overall area defined for the operation would require more forces anyway. The Aspides mandate defines the operational area broadly and is not limited to the route between Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, but also includes the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf.
Four ships for an operational area the size of the EU
Admiral Gryparis is faced with a mammoth task, particularly in view of the space to be covered. He is pinning his hopes on a Force Generation Conference on 19 April. For the time being, therefore, he has to restrict himself to an area where there is the greatest danger to merchant shipping. This is still the Huthi's immediate sphere of influence - i.e. from Bab-el-Mandeb to Yemen's northern border with Saudi Arabia. If the Houthis change their approach, either geographically or tactically, adjustments will have to be made to their own approach as well as their approach to naval warfare. For Admiral Gryparis, it is still too early to assess the impact of the EU measures on the Huthi's further actions.
Between the lines, the Greek admiral conceded that the record-breaking reliability of the High Representative's call-up of Aspides at his headquarters also cast a shadow. Coordination with friendly nations, in particular with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, first had to be established. Also with international shipping information centres such as UKTMO. Performing the strategic leadership role over long distances proved to be no mean feat. Even seemingly trivial matters such as the logistical and medical supply of the units at sea were hurdles that had to be overcome.
Tactical successes and strategic question marks
Although the progress of Aspides to date can certainly be seen as a success, questions remain, and not only with regard to the EU's ability to hold out, as mentioned in the briefing.
EU member states have naval units in the region for various reasons. France has a frigate out of national interest. Denmark and the Netherlands participate in Prosperity Guardian. The Hague deployed "HNLMS Tromp" to the US-led operation before it continues its world tour. Copenhagen deployed the frigate "Iver Huitfeldt". Brussels will have to ask itself how long the EU can afford to go it alone if it wants to maintain the claim formulated today by Borrell to be a global maritime security provider.
On the other side, the Houthis seem unimpressed by the failure rate of their drone and missile attacks. In the more than 80 attacks to date, they can only claim the loss of the "Rubymar" and the successful capture of the "Galaxy Leader" as successes. While some drones and missiles have been shot down by both the EU and the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian units, the Huthi attacks do not appear to have lost any of their intensity. Scepticism seems appropriate, as the air strikes by the US and British forces have not resulted in any noticeable operational losses on the Houthi side.
Should the Houthi attempts to carry their attacks into the Arabian Sea be perpetuated, this would mean an overstretching of the EU's available deployment of forces. The extent to which additional units can be found will have to be seen on 19 April.
Which raises the question of the exit strategy. It remained unanswered at the event on the 115th day of the crisis in the Red Sea.
However, the strategic considerations appear to be deliberately ignored. As a strategic argument, free use of the seas is the third component of the operation in the order book. From the perspective of merchant shipping, the situation has levelled off. The level of transits has not changed since around mid-January - the 50 per cent compared to "normal" traffic mentioned in the briefing. In contrast, the major container shipping companies are sticking to their policy of avoiding the Red Sea. This leads to the conclusion that ships are being escorted that would have travelled through the area anyway. It is recognisable that the delays caused by the Red Sea, although not insignificant, are not as great as the disruptions during coronavirus times.
From another political angle, too, the question arises as to why the EU is taking military risks while the main parties involved (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China and Turkey) are holding their own. Failure, e.g. a hit on an EU warship, would be more than just a loss of prestige. The actuality of the threat would be a success for the Houthis and Iran, which is acting behind them. It would also be a loss of credibility that the EU cannot stand up for freedom of navigation. This is at stake anyway, as accusations can be levelled in other sea areas for not having intervened there: in the Black Sea and the China Sea. In the eyes of the 'Global South' school of thought, this is yet another argument in favour of the West using international maritime law as an instrument to its own advantage.
There is also an economic consideration. A look at the SCFI index shows that it is on the decline. The Shanghai Containerised Freight Index rate, which is one of the most important rate indicators for containerised sea freight, stood at USD 1745.43/TEU on 8 April. It peaked at 3103 US dollars/TEU on 12 January. Before the crisis in the Red Sea, it was USD 1029/TEU. TEU stands for Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, a twenty-foot container. While the situation is easing for North Americans and Europeans, this is not the case for other regions. Due to the disruptions in the Red Sea, Maersk had levied a peak season surcharge (Easter, Ramadan) from Northern Europe and the Mediterranean to Djibouti of USD 300 per container - which, based on the SCFI of 8 April, amounts to approximately USD 2050 more for a container. Djibouti is the transshipment centre for goods for 128 million people in Ethiopia.
Text: Hans - Uwe Mergener
This article was published with the kind permission of Europäische Sicherheit und Technik https://esut.de/
English 
German
0 Kommentare