The fate of the "Moskva"

Almost 40 years of Soviet-Russian naval history sank into the Black Sea with the cruiser Moskva. A bitter loss for the superpower.

On 13 April, Ukraine reported that the Russian missile cruiser Moskva, a type ship of the Slava class, had been hit and fatally damaged by Ukrainian R-360 Neptune missiles. While the background to the fate of the Moskva was initially the subject of intensive information and disinformation campaigns by the Ukrainian and Russian sides, the first swathes of fog were soon lifted. On 14 April, the Russian Ministry of Defence confirmed the sinking of the Moskva and on the following day, a source from US defence circles announced that, according to "medium confidence" estimates, the damage to the Moskva had actually been caused by two Neptune missiles.

Russia did not lose just any ship with the sinking of the Moskva. Alongside the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliki of the Kirov class, the three Slava cruisers were the most visible remaining symbols of the once mighty Soviet naval fleet in the service of the Russian Federation.

Like her sister ships, the Moskva, which entered service in 1982 as the Slava, was designed as a missile cruiser for surface naval warfare and was therefore equipped with eight highly visible twin launchers for SS-N-12 Sandbox sea-target missiles. Launched in 1976 at the 61 Kommunara shipyard in the city of Mykolaiv, now part of Ukraine, the Slava was initially put into service with the Soviet naval fleet. Units of this class displace a maximum of around 12,000 tonnes. The crew numbers around 500 sailors, including more than 400 crew and non-commissioned officers.

In the 1980s, the Moskva served several times in the Mediterranean. In this context, the unit gained greater attention when it was to be used to organise the summit meeting of US President George H. W. Bush and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in 1989. Due to the severe weather conditions, which subsequently gave the event the name "Seasick Summit", the meeting was not held on the Slava, but the Soviet delegation was embarked on board.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Slava began a lengthy shipyard phase that was to last throughout the entire period of disintegration of the Russian (naval) armed forces in that decade. In the mid-nineties, the decision was made to rename the unit Moskva. Returned to active service at the turn of the millennium and since then the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva has taken part in almost all of Russia's significant naval activities over the last two decades.

For example, the Moskva deployed to the Indian Ocean for the Russian-Indian naval exercise Indra 2003. The unit also took part in the NATO exercise Active Endeavour in 2006. Two years later, the Moskva was reported at least twice as part of the Russian task force off the coast of Georgia during the war there. At the end of the noughties, the cruiser repeatedly took part in long-distance voyages, including destinations in Latin America and the Mediterranean, and in 2013 became one of the first units to become the flagship of the newly established permanent Mediterranean grouping of the Russian naval fleet. During the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Moskva monitored access to Donuslav Bay, which was blocked by Ukrainian warships.

Especially since the deterioration of relations with NATO and the EU, the Moskva has also increasingly conducted exercises with the navies of other middle and major powers, for example with Egypt ("Bridge of Friendship 2015") and the People's Republic of China ("Joint Sea 2015"). At an operational level, the periodic presence of the Moskva contributed significantly to the firepower of the Russian Mediterranean force and signalled Russia's willingness to deter NATO member states in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly during the escalating phases of the Syrian war.
The cruiser was characterised by its repeated participation in several operational-strategic, cross-force exercises, such as Vostok 2010, Kawkas 2012 and Kawkas 2020. Finally, the Moskva played a central role as the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet in the Russo-Ukrainian War from February 2022, most recently as part of the Russian strike and blockade force off the Ukrainian Black Sea coast. In this role, the Moskva sank about 50 nautical miles off the coastline, not far from its former construction site, with the Saint Andrew flag flying.

To summarise, for decades the Moskva was a flagship of Russian ambitions in the maritime domain that extended far beyond the Black Sea. This was true both in the conduct of co-operative naval diplomacy with strategic partners and the exercise of collaborative actions with NATO in the brighter days of NATO-Russia relations. But also confrontationally through its participation in the Syria mission, its role in Russia's deterrence strategy and its participation in military operations in violation of international law during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and most recently in the current Russian-Ukrainian war.

For the Russian Federation and the Black Sea Fleet in particular, the sinking of the Moskva is a significant moral blow. As has been widely reported in the media, the Moskva was the first capital ship to be sunk during combat operations since the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano on 2 May 1982 during the Falklands War. The cruiser's name - which translates as "Moscow" - plays a key role here. Anyone familiar with German naval history will know the significance of the names of naval ships during the war. It was not without reason that the armoured ship Deutschland was renamed Lützow at the end of 1939 in order to minimise the loss of prestige in the event of a negative outcome to the battle. The loss of the pride of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, named after the Russian capital, came at a time when Russia's original invasion plan for Ukraine had failed and the fighting in the south and east of Ukraine was degenerating into a war of attrition with heavy losses. Depending on how the Russian-Ukrainian war develops, it cannot be ruled out that the fall of the Moskva River will go down in history as part of a possible change in perception.

Finally, the loss of the Moskva River is also interesting from an operational point of view. On the one hand, this applies to the Russian units in the theatre of operations. Although primarily designed as an anti-surface warfare unit, the Moskva, with its 8x8 SA-N-6 launchers, had, at least in theory, a pronounced long-range air defence capability and thus made a significant contribution to unit air defence. In view of the extremely low number of medium and large warships (green to blue water units), it may well prove to be a difficult challenge for Russia to quickly and adequately replace this loss of capability. This is all the more true in light of the fact that various Western nations have already announced their intention to supply Ukraine with more anti-ship missiles. The reports immediately following the sinking of the Moskva that Russian warships had left and significantly increased their distance from the Ukrainian coast can also be interpreted in this context.

On the other hand, the implications of the incident could also be closely examined with regard to the German Navy and give a new impetus to the debate on anti-access area denial (A2/AD) and the capability for national and alliance defence, particularly with regard to the acquisition of large warships. Critics may argue that the Russian SA-N-6 Grumble air defence system technically reflects the state of the late Cold War and cannot be compared with the performance of modern Western-style air defence systems. This is countered by the fact that some of the most powerful missile systems of the latest Russian and Chinese design have far more dangerous capabilities than the Ukrainian R-360 Neptune.

It is therefore worth taking another look at Russian naval history. As Andrew Lambert has described in detail, during the Crimean War between 1853 and 1856, the heavy ships of the line of the Royal Navy and their French and Turkish allies found it extremely difficult to operate successfully against the land-based Russian batteries at Sevastopol, which had enormous firepower and good cover. As the war progressed, the Royal Navy found itself facing the dreaded Russian fortifications at the southern tip of what was then Russian Finland and Kronstadt. The British changed their operational approach and also attacked with many small, fast gunboats. These were considerably more difficult for the Russian coastal artillery to combat and their sheer numbers made it possible to compensate for losses. With a barrage of fire from their heavy mortars, they targeted the weak points of the Russian fortress, particularly in the arsenal area. This neutralised the critical infrastructure of the Russian fortress at Sweaborg after a short time compared to the siege of Sevastopol.

Tobias Kollakowski is a PhD student at King's College London and research associate at the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS).

Tobias Kollakowski