More than six years ago, the war in Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea brought the now widespread awareness of the relevance of national and alliance defence back onto the agenda of military and security policy planners. In particular, supplying the eastern NATO allies by sea (Sea Lanes of Communication) and also via land routes (keyword: Suwałki Gap, the 65-kilometre narrow land connection between Poland and Lithuania) in the event of a conflict has regularly come to the fore. The calculation of a possible military conflict within Europe reveals several NATO priorities at the maritime level. A look at the Baltic Sea shows that the Alliance and its partner nations, namely Sweden and Finland, are utilising the wide range of maritime capabilities: from increased international cooperation and presence - even during a pandemic - to the externally effective recovery of capabilities for highly complex, three-dimensional naval warfare and the associated conventional deterrence capability. Maritime strategic considerations in the Baltic Sea region therefore involve more than "just" securing supply routes to Klaipeda, Riga and Tallinn. Among other things, the effects of a newly flared up global great power competition (great power competition). In the following, some of these influences are explained and presented in a broader context with selected security policy challenges in the Baltic Sea region.
Maritime activities even during a pandemic
Despite the still omnipresent effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, large-scale initiatives by naval forces from a wide range of players can be observed in the Baltic Sea. Developments in recent months show that the Mare Balticum has lost none of its important role in the security policy considerations of the neighbouring countries and, in particular, the North Atlantic defence alliance, NATO. This can be seen, among other things, in the Baltops 2020 (Baltic Operations) manoeuvre carried out in June of this year. Despite limiting conditions - the manoeuvre took place exclusively at sea - NATO navies came together for the 49th time and were joined by their partners from Sweden and Finland. With almost 30 sea-going units, additional aircraft and helicopters and a total of over 3,000 soldiers involved, the aim was to demonstrate a presence, but also to emphasise its own commitments to regional security even under the most exceptional conditions. Just a few weeks later, a large-scale display of Russian naval forces and their capabilities took place as part of Russian Navy Day - the bank holidays reintroduced by Vladimir Putin in 2013. As in previous years, units from various parts of the fleet were assembled in Russian coastal regions, in particular off Kronstadt near St. Petersburg. The passage through the Danish straits of strategic submarines that are oversized by the standards of the Baltic Sea, such as this year's Oscar II class, together with the accompanying spectacular photographs, has almost become a tradition. Following the celebrations, the Russian naval fleet also carried out Ocean Shield 2020, an annual Baltic Sea manoeuvre with over 30 naval vessels taking part, demonstrating their capabilities in the region.
Influences of great power competition
The year 2014 is still often described as a turning point in the international order. Building on this, however, it must be noted that further developments in (supra)regional security policy have emerged in the almost seven years since the events in Ukraine. Certainly, the discourse of recent years has been characterised by the almost omnipresent "recollection" of the Western community of states. This became visible through NATO resolutions, particularly after the summits in Warsaw (2016), Brussels (2018) and London (2019), but also through the initiatives of individual states, such as the endeavours of the German Navy in the Baltic Sea region and on the northern flank.
However, the effects of the great power rivalry between the USA and the Russian Federation have also made themselves felt in the region, particularly in the recent past. For example, accusations made against Russia by the United States and Western intelligence services led to the USA withdrawing from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in summer 2019 to eliminate short and medium-range (500 to 5,500 km) land-based missiles and cruise missiles. The accusations are based on information that Russia is in breach of the 1987 treaty with its 9M729 weapons system, better known as Iskander-K. The other side denies this. This is denied by the other side. The dissolution of long-standing treaties continues with the announcement by the United States that it will withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty concluded in 1992.-Treaty. For years, this agreement between former power blocs, NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states, was regarded as a confidence-building measure with a model character. The treaty, which will continue to exist after the pending withdrawal of the USA, allows reciprocal overflights over the territories of the contracting parties to take aerial photographs under agreed conditions ("An open sky from Vancouver to Vladivostok"). In this case, too, the Russian side is accused of inconsistencies in the fulfilment of the agreement, although disputes over selected overflight areas have not been uncommon in recent years. Finally, the extension of the New Start-Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The treaty, which was concluded in 2010 as part of the failed reset of relations between the USA and Russia, deals with the limitation of warheads and strategic delivery systems for nuclear weapons of both states. The arms control agreement is in the tradition of the previous Start I and Start II treaties and could be extended by five years in 2021 instead of expiring - thus providing sufficient time to negotiate a new, joint arms control treaty. However, Russian and American positions in this context are currently still too different to foresee a new agreement. The unresolved role of China as a military power with its own nuclear arsenal is an additional explosive factor.
The three examples mentioned paint a bleak picture of bilateral relations between the two superpowers and cast a direct shadow over Europe, the Baltic Sea region and the neighbouring nations. While the Open Skies Treaty basically reflects a demonstration of trust between the contracting parties, the two other agreements deal with very specific military risks for the region. The cancelled INF Treaty opens up the possibility for the Russian armed forces to deploy weapons systems that could reach far into Western Europe. A possible expiry of New Start, in turn, could result in a new arms race at the nuclear level.
This analysis should not ignore the fact that the great power competition described above also has an impact on other levels besides the military one. The Baltic Sea is of great economic importance for all neighbouring states. Ferry traffic, fishing, tourism and, in particular, freight transport ensure a daily volume of over 2,500 ships (before the current pandemic). At the same time, the connections between the Baltic Sea states via submarine cables for data transport and energy supply, as well as pipelines, are of vital importance. With regard to the latter, the expansion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been a constant topic for several years. This applies not only to national, but also to international circles. Partners and allies have often expressed surprise, even confusion, at Germany's notorious adherence to the "purely economic" expansion of the pipeline - in contrast to Germany's parallel security policy commitments in the region, embodied by the navy, the air force and the army. But even in this case, the effects of global great power politics are now making themselves felt. With the threat of economic sanctions from the USA, voices within the German government are also beginning to recognise the political dimension of the strategic pipeline project. In fact, this dispute - irrespective of the current US president - must be kept more closely in mind. The threat of sanctions does not come from just any ally but, in the event of a military conflict in the region, from the presumably decisive security actor.
Russia's maritime capabilities in the Baltic Sea region
With regard to the military challenges in the region, the Russian Federation has once again manoeuvred itself into the focus of the security policy concerns of NATO and its partners. The corresponding capabilities of the Russian military in the Baltic Sea region are articulated in particular by the numerical dominance of the Western Military District and the Kaliningrad Oblast. The recently advanced modernisation of the Russian land forces and their relatively high concentration in the west of the country have attracted particular attention. Corresponding risks are primarily presented in connection with a possible invasion of the three Baltic states, for example in a 2016 report by the American think tank Rand, which considers it possible for Russian troops to march through to Tallinn or Riga within 60 hours. However, this is not intended to be a purely numerical list of the armed forces. Rather, the aim here is to shed as much light as possible on the strategic approach at the maritime level.
A look at this component accordingly allows a modified image to be categorised. Instead of the assumed goal of sea control by the Russian navy in the past or a "breakout" as in the Cold War era, the Baltic Sea is now seen more as a supporting element of a "geographical defence zone" of the Russian Federation. This implies a regional defence strategy that is, however, based on offensive means to deter states and actors in the region. While the state of the Russian navy has sometimes been ridiculed, those responsible appear to have made a virtue of the necessity of a shrunken fleet and a decimated shipbuilding industry: The concentration on smaller, but by their standards quite capable units, often equipped with cruise missiles, sufficiently fulfils the purpose of coastal and national defence and simultaneous deterrence. In the Baltic Fleet, this is primarily emphasised by the newer Steregushchi corvettes (currently four units), Bujan-M and Karakurt (two each). The fact that only the former have sufficient deep-sea capability does not stand in the way of the aforementioned strategic purposes. Rather, the fleet's marginal equipment in terms of its submarine capabilities is striking in this context: only one older submarine of the Kilo-Class is available and must be regularly supplemented by units from the Northern Fleet.
The seaborne units receive elementary support from the coastal defence batteries stationed within Kaliningrad (primarily of the Bastion and Bal types), electronic warfare installations (such as the Murmansk-BN jammer) and the extensive air defence. The latter is defined by at least two divisions equipped with air defence capabilities (such as the S-400, S-300 and Tor-M2 systems), as well as a wide range of fighter aircraft, bombers and helicopters as part of a large naval aviation component. Overall, these elements must be seen as part of a larger interplay of the aforementioned broad national defence. This is referred to as the model of a "layered defence" of Russian territory. This combines the maritime component in the form of the Baltic Fleet with the installations in Kaliningrad and the armed forces stationed in the western military district.
The air defence and coastal defence systems are regularly mentioned in the context of supposedly impregnable A2/AD zones (anti-access/area denial), in which it is almost impossible to operate or only possible at the risk of total loss. In recent years, this emphasis has spread a narrative that favours the Russian leadership (and industry). In the meantime, the depictions, often visualised as circles drawn on geographical maps of the Baltic Sea region, have been de-mystified by international scientists and military personnel. In particular, the correction of ranges of various weapon systems and actual effective radii of action in relation to target acquisition plays a role. For example, it can be stated that proclaimed maximum ranges do not include natural obstacles or active deviations from the flight routes (e.g. course corrections of the missiles). The interaction with external sensors and radar systems is also often ignored. This is by no means intended to underestimate Russia's military capabilities. However, such analyses help to give a more realistic picture of the components and the risks they pose. For example, a study by the Swedish Defence Agency (FOI) describes the effective range of the S400 air defence system, equipped with missiles currently available for the model, as no greater than 20 to 35 kilometres should a target approach at low altitude.
Conclusion and outlook
The increased attention for the Baltic Sea region, for the defence capabilities of the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO in general are a positive signal with regard to the recognition of the security policy reality of the 21st century. In this context, it must be recognised that the Baltic Sea in particular cannot be regarded as a separate operational area without any external influence. For this reason, the approach of an overarching northern flank, which includes Scandinavia, the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic in a comprehensive strategic picture, is an important step. It is clear that the effects of great power competition and the dissolution of the international treaties described above cast their shadow not only on the Baltic Sea region, but on Europe as a whole. These statements emphasise why the Federal Republic of Germany cannot shirk its supra-regional responsibility. The discussion about Nord Stream 2 is not just about the question of whether the USA or Russia is in favour or against. Above all, it also involves the issue of practised European solidarity. It is no longer possible for Germany to flee into the corner of a neutral player that has become too big.
Despite the increased focus on the security policy and, in particular, maritime challenges in the region, there is still great potential for optimisation in terms of general military capabilities and international cooperation between the Baltic Sea states in light of global great power competition. This applies not only to the supra-regional level with institutions such as NATO and the EU, but also to sub-regional links with neighbouring states. For example, increased efforts in terms of overarching Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) are recommended. This could include all neighbouring NATO members as well as Sweden and Finland in order to guarantee a continuous and detailed picture of the situation in the Baltic Sea. It would also make sense to empower the three Baltic states in this development, but also beyond that, by strengthening their maritime capabilities. In this context, for example, increased joint procurement processes as part of a coordinated distribution of capabilities would be expedient in order to efficiently cover the needs of the small states and the Alliance.
In conclusion, it must be emphasised that the nations around the Baltic Sea will have to come to terms with the security policy developments and the associated explosiveness for the foreseeable future. At the same time, active action should continue to be taken against narratives that aim to cast the security policy discourse in an unfavourable light. After all, similar to the A2/AD zones discussed above, the next challenge is already looming in the form of Russia's recently unveiled hypersonic missiles. This "hyper-hype" will not only have to be defended militarily, but also discursively.
Text: Julian Pawlak
Photos: US Navy
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