Keep war away from Swedish soil

A land war has been raging in Ukraine since 24 February. What maritime conclusions can be drawn from this for the Swedish navy?

Almost in step with the German government, Sweden has announced its intention to increase defence spending to two percent of gross domestic product in the coming years - up from the current meagre 1.1 percent.

Although television images and news reports mainly show ground battles, from a Swedish perspective there are also important maritime aspects that justify a closer look. A war of aggression requires huge amounts of supplies. It seems that despite months of preparation, existing transport infrastructure and a long border with Ukraine, the Russian forces are struggling to maintain logistics. The Russian units fighting at the front are often simply no longer supplied with the necessary consumables and are therefore at a standstill or moving very slowly. How much more difficult would it be if instead of a land border between the nations there was a 300 kilometre wide sea? That's why the Swedish navy must have effective weapons systems to combat sea targets. Missiles, torpedoes and mines sink the ships of an attacker, everything else in the navy creates the conditions for this. Sweden is in possession of such weapons. Both our submarines and our corvettes are difficult for an enemy to locate and engage. It is vital that an enemy is defeated before it can capture a Swedish harbour and establish a permanent foothold in the hinterland. So the first conclusion is that anti-ship weapon systems must always be the core of a navy.

The war must be kept as far away from Swedish soil as possible. We have seen in Chechnya, in Syria and now in Ukraine the barbaric methods Russia uses to wage war. How Putin's army deliberately destroys civilian buildings, attacks hospitals and civilians in order to break up society. And unfortunately we have to realise that this resilience is probably lower in Sweden than in Ukraine. While the people of Kiev are rushing to the bomb shelters, we read in the newspapers about outraged Swedes demanding to be allowed to take their puppies there. The second conclusion is therefore that the navy plays an important role in keeping the war off Swedish soil.

Ukraine's imports and exports are being cut off by the blockade of harbours and maritime trade routes. Although the country is able to fend off Russian amphibious operations, Ukraine's trade via the important sea route has been extremely affected. This has been reflected in global grain prices and is hitting the Ukrainian economy extremely hard, especially at this difficult time. Compared to Sweden, Ukraine has a much larger land border with friendly European countries. Nevertheless, the interruption of maritime transport has enormous consequences. Sweden is much more dependent on shipping than Ukraine. And not only Sweden. Gothenburg on the Swedish west coast is even the largest import and export port for its neighbour Norway!

The conclusion can therefore only be to invest large parts of the defence budget, which will double in size in future, in strengthening sea defence on the west coast. The restoration of the amphibious regiment in Gothenburg with its naval battalion is an important first step, but it is not enough. The fleet units stationed on the south and east coasts are needed for the tasks described above. They cannot fight enemy troop transports in the Baltic Sea and at the same time protect commercial traffic on the west coast. We must not be caught in the dilemma of having to choose between the east and west coasts.

Captain Jonas Hård af Segerstad is currently taking part in the 53rd Admiral's Staff Officer Course at the Command and Staff College in Hamburg. In August, he will become the Swedish defence attaché in Berlin.

Jonas Hård af Segerstad