"Slava" in the Strait of Messina, 1984 Copyright: Prof. Dr med. habil. Hans Anton Adams
The Russian guided missile cruiser "Москва", "Moskva", hull number 121, sank on 14 April 2022. The previous afternoon, information spread that the lead ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet had been hit by coast-to-ship missiles. The Ministry of Defence in Moscow confirmed the sinking without mentioning the missile attack. Tass reports that ammunition exploded as a result of a fire, causing severe damage. The crew was evacuated, it added.
Attempt at an analysis
The hype surrounding the sinking of the cruiser, already stylised as a battleship by some media, is dying down. A salvage ship, the 110-year-old "Kommuna", was put to sea (MFO reported). The Russian Ministry of Defence has confirmed the loss, including the casualties among the crew. Despite Moscow's acknowledgement, the causes are still largely shrouded in fog. A reason for us to take a closer look at the Russian operations in the Black Sea surrounding the total loss of the "Moskva". It should be noted in advance that the information obtained on the basis of the scant facts and by means of open intelligence (OSINT), combined with our own background experience and that of consulted naval comrades, leads to the assessments and conclusions made here. Reports from the Russian and Ukrainian authorities cannot be independently verified.
Events surrounding the "Moskva" before its sinking
Possible landing operations
The Russian Black Sea Fleet supported the war from the sea with the use of cruise missiles. As far as is known, its operations were an important support in the attempts to capture Mariupol.
The "Moskva" was assigned the role of a lead ship. Her other tasks included (artillery) fire support during operations on land positions as well as long-range air defence for the other surface units in action, in particular the landing units (which, as far as we know, had not yet been deployed). As far as can be deduced from its armament, it was not necessarily involved in firing rockets at land targets. Its missile armament does not indicate this. The SS-N-12 is not a cruise missile and experts confirm that firing at land targets is only possible in an emergency procedure. The use of their naval artillery against land targets is conceivable. The double-barrelled 130 mm is said to have a range of around 25 kilometres against surface targets. In the event of support for land operations in the Donetsk Oblast, this would mean navigating in the Sea of Azov.
Three missions of the "Moskva" can be traced. On the very first day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 24 February, the "Moskva" once again made history with the episode around Snake Island. Escorted by the patrol ship Project 22160, "Vasily Bykov", she demanded that the Ukrainian company stationed there surrender. The vulgar refusal of the defenders, transmitted by radio, has since acquired philatelic significance. On 15 and 30 March, it was documented in the two most important examples in connection with attempted amphibious operations in the Odessa region, which have not yet been completed.
After initial deception operations, which began on 2 March, the Russian navy staged amphibious demonstrations. On both 15 and 30 March, six landing ships manoeuvred south of Odessa towards the coast. However, an amphibious assault on Odessa did not materialise. One explanation for this could be that the advance by land from the Crimea was held up. Another reason for the Russian navy's restraint could have been the now recognisable mine threat in the sea area. It is also conceivable that the actions were deliberate deceptive manoeuvres to tie down Ukrainian forces. They were also part of the general threat backdrop that the Russian armed forces used for their own purposes.
Be that as it may, since the beginning of the war, units of Russian naval forces have been observed from land operating in a predictable pattern off the coast of Odessa and in the vicinity of Snake Island (source: 'international' Open Intelligence).
Odessa is the most important Black Sea harbour in Ukraine and was probably an early target of the Russian advance. The city is strategically and economically important. The capture of Odessa would make Ukraine almost landlocked and could help to realise another strategic goal, namely the creation of a land bridge to Transnistria, an unrecognised breakaway state in Moldova supported by Russia. This theory was given new impetus after the attacks on Odessa on the weekend of 23/24 April.
The overall impression is that the Kremlin's aim from the outset was to occupy the whole of Ukraine. This conclusion can be drawn in view of the lines of advance initially indicated by Russia, taking into account the targets selected for the cruise missiles. In this respect, the threat of amphibious attempts in the Odessa area had a real strategic background.
Other operations
It is possible that the "Moskva" was also involved in enforcing the naval blockade; attacks on merchant ships are not documented. According to American information, it remained within range of the coast. Like all Russian warships, the "Moskva" regularly returned to her home port of Sevastopol. Interestingly, she docked at her usual position. However, this predictable movement pattern was not to her disadvantage. The behaviour of the Russian navy could be an indicator of how safe Sevastopol is considered to be.
The sister ships "Marshal Ustinov" from the Northern Fleet and "Varyag" from the Pacific Fleet were ordered to the Mediterranean during the preparatory phase of Moscow's invasion (ESuT reported), where they are currently still located.
A look at Ukrainian maritime capabilities
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Another addition: experts point out that the large radar antennas on the pictures of the damaged ship are all locked in the neutral position. They are unlikely to have been moved to this position after the hits. This indicates that the ship's state of readiness was low and did not even correspond to the war march level. Behind this, one can assume a combination of incorrect assessment of the situation and convenience. In any case, it is anything but professional behaviour in a war zone.