Russia - the great crisis

Putin is concerned with restoring former greatness on the scale of the Soviet Union

Rarely have external threats shaken up the public in Germany as much as in recent weeks. My old navy and crew mates asked me to take a stand on this. I had to write three versions, and I hope that this one will survive the time between the editorial deadline and the publication of the April issue.

At the last major turning point in 1989/90, people said "the word is getting old". This time, the upheaval is perhaps even faster and at least as radical. What was so surprising about the events of winter 2021/22? Couldn't we have known after the Russian annexation of Crimea at the beginning of 2014 what kind of man Vladimir Putin is? Couldn't we have changed course by then? The denunciation of the European peace order of 1990 was too silent, too bloodless. The Ukrainian armed forces offered no resistance worth mentioning and the entire nation appeared paralysed rather than combative. At the same time, Russia skilfully managed to establish its view of things as a widely believed narrative.

Even if Germany is not as directly affected as the warring states of Ukraine and Russia, there has been a security policy revolution in this country. In just a few minutes, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz wiped away all the certainties of three decades of foreign and defence policy. What for some was redemption after many leaden years was for others the destruction of their ideal world. Hurt feelings, broken promises and the alleged threat posed by NATO's aggressive eastward expansion were readily accepted as justifications in the West. They were accepted as the Russian point of view, which had to be understood. At the same time, this was a convenient way of getting rid of the need to draw unpopular consequences from the new situation.

Let's take a look at Russia's myths. They have all been thoroughly scrutinised in recent weeks by experts in politics, diplomacy and historical research. I am therefore on fairly solid ground when I endeavour to refute or debunk the most important of them on this basis.

Firstly, there is the claim that NATO promised Russia in 1990 that it would not expand eastwards. It is true that in the various consultations and negotiations in the run-up to German reunification, there were many opinions and statements by politicians and diplomats that included such a renunciation. What is important, however, is what is ultimately written on paper, because none of the personalities mentioned had the authority to make such commitments on behalf of their country or even the entire alliance. In the Two Plus Four Treaty of 1990, it was only agreed that no non-German NATO forces would be stationed on the territory of the former GDR. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, Russia raised no objections to countries in the east joining NATO. NATO undertook not to transfer any nuclear weapons to the territory of the accession countries and not to permanently station any substantial combat forces from other countries there. At the same time, the signatories, including Russia, undertook to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other or against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence. In this respect, Russia has not only broken promises with its operations against Ukrainian territory, but also written commitments.

Incidentally, the very term NATO eastward enlargement is misleading. NATO has not invaded anywhere, it has not occupied any territories and stationed troops there. On the contrary, many countries in Eastern Europe joined NATO as soon as it became possible for them to do so. Given their decades of experience with Soviet rule, they neither had to be forced nor persuaded to do so. Just how right their move was is now being confirmed. The accession of Central and Eastern European states is therefore not a threat to a militarily strong Russia. The only danger posed by the West is not its armed forces, but the ideas of the Western social order for Putin's system of rule.

What particularly annoyed me with regard to our own recent history was the claim that Crimea was lost to Ukraine. Many in the old Federal Republic were prepared to give up on reunification and join the GDR's demand for "recognition of reality". Didn't the balance of power in the Cold War demand this? If the Federal Government had complied, the fall of communism in 1989 would have been very different. We learnt that no power constellation lasts forever. So anyone who, especially as a German, gives up Crimea before a peace treaty is simply oblivious to history.

And finally, it is said time and again that Russia should be shown more respect, that it should be accommodated first and make some concessions. The West should also ask itself what it has done wrong. I think the last question is quite justified. After 1990, the USA certainly failed to devote sufficient attention to Russia's role in the global community and to formulate viable ideas on the subject. Germany has forgotten the old experience that Russia respects strength but despises weakness. Willy Brandt had understood that one can only negotiate successfully with Moscow from a position of strength. At the beginning of his Ostpolitik, he sent a signal by increasing the Bundeswehr by around 35,000 men. In doing so, he demonstrated that the Federal Republic was prepared to bear the main responsibility for the conventional defence of Central Europe. After 1990, this role was considered obsolete. The decision in 2011 to reduce the number of main battle tanks from 3,500 to 220 may have been the administrative implementation of a new capability profile for some defence bureaucrats. Politically, it was a devastating signal: Germany was signing itself off as the provider of Europe's conventional defence. This conventional weakness of the West meant for the Kremlin: Europe may have many strengths, but it cannot defend itself physically. But Russia would have respected that alone. The West's mistake was therefore not to show Russia too little respect, but rather not to show itself enough respect.

In the days and weeks leading up to the attack on 24 February, the USA gradually debunked and refuted every Russian narrative, ruthlessly exposed the real intentions and knocked any legitimacy out of Putin's hands. Because he was running out of time, he then struck brutally without any attempt at justification.

RUS tank on manoeuvre 2

This has shown that the narratives cultivated by Russia and eagerly seized upon by many in the West were false. Putin was never concerned with broken promises or perceived threats, but from the outset with the restoration of former greatness on the scale of the Soviet Union.

Putin has also disregarded an old experience and misjudged the weakness of the West. The West always came together in existential crises and was prepared to stand up for its freedom, in the Second World War, in the Cold War and again today. We don't know what will happen next. If there is no agreement behind the scenes, we still have a long, bloody partisan struggle ahead of us. After the Second World War, it took the Soviet Union until the 1950s to break the last resistance in Ukraine. This time it may take even longer because there is the world's gaze and support from outside. It is doubtful whether the Putin regime will last that long. And after him, the cards will be reshuffled.

As in the days of Willy Brandt, the West will now have to show strength and must not make any advances that could be interpreted as weakness. First of all, this requires strengthening Europe's conventional defence in order to create a credible negotiating position. One ray of hope is that, after a long period of hesitation, German policy, which is so crucial to Europe's security, has learnt the right lessons from the current situation. We can only hope that the bloodshed can soon be permanently ended and replaced by a stable peace.