It was 25 years ago these days that the German Navy evacuated the German Somalia Support Unit from Mogadishu. This army unit had previously supported the United Nations Operation UNOSOM II in Somalia.
It was the army's first major foreign deployment, which came to an abrupt end when the USA withdrew hastily from the operation and the German troops were left to fend for themselves.
The circumstances of the subsequent Southern Cross evacuation operation were widely discussed at the time. However, if you want to read up on this today, you will only find a single Wikipedia article (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Southern_Cross), which was based on the reports of the then Marine-The operation has long been forgotten. This operation has long since been forgotten, overshadowed by more recent missions and, in recent years, a return to national and alliance defence.
What are the lessons learnt from Mogadishu? Firstly, the operation was characterised by the lack of a Bundeswehr command organisation for such missions. There was no organisation that was able to manage the confusion of competencies, the disputes and, above all, the jealousies of the various branches of the armed forces and lead all forces operationally. This provided the impetus to set up the Operational Command a few years later
On the other hand, it became apparent that the Marine simply lacked the appropriate ships to move army troops. At that time, frigates and a supply ship were used as transports. The small SeaLynx helicopters flew out the last contingent completely, a masterpiece of improvisation, but in principle an indictment of poverty.
The Inspector General at the time therefore called for a so-called multi-purpose ship, which in other countries would simply have been called a dock landing ship. The idea behind this so-called Naumann Ark was to be able to bring troops ashore and back again independently of harbours and provide them with logistical support. This primarily required amphibious ships, which would also have been ideal platforms for humanitarian aid operations.
The resulting opportunities have been Marine in its concept for supporting joint operations from the sea (Basis See). Although the Bundeswehr could have made good use of such a capacity in the phase of major foreign deployments that began after Mogadishu, the initiative failed. The same happened to two other attempts, which were organised under the names Einsatztruppenunterstützungsschiff (ETrUS) and Joint Support Ship (JSS) have gone down in history.
The only thing that has been achieved is a co-operation agreement with the Netherlands on the joint use of their landing ship Karel Doorman. There is also the ARC agreement with Denmark on joint transport with merchant ships.
Since the Crimean invasion at the latest, attention has turned to other naval projects. Now the focus is once again on powerful surface ships and submarines, submarine hunters and new mine defences.
However, if you read official documents such as the 2016 White Paper, you will find that international crisis management is on a par with national and alliance defence. This means that foreign missions have not disappeared, the requirements for them still exist.
25 years after Mogadishu, a quarter of a century after Operation Southern Cross, it is therefore time to take stock. What was it like back then, and what lessons are still relevant today? To do this, however, and this is the third lesson, you need good documentation and an unbiased evaluation of what worked and what did not.
English 
German
@Author:
Thank you for your text and for initiating a debate worth reading.
@Sailor:
I think your idea of a medium-sized, multi-purpose ship is very effective. This idea has been around from time to time. In the "Zielvorstellung Marine 2025+" (VS-NfD), for example, the relevant passages can be read about the "Mehrzweck-Einsatzschiff" (MEZS) designed by Vice Admiral Nolting as a replacement for the Tender Class 404.
In my opinion, a medium-sized landing ship, such as the Russian "Ivan Gren class" (or your models shown), offers the best prerequisites for being able to fulfil the widest possible range of additional operational tasks on a modular basis, e.g. in addition to the staff and supply functions of a Class 404 tender:
- "Mothership" for "Unmanned Surface Vessels", e.g. two "Seehund" minesweeper drones on the flood deck;
- "Mothership" for unmanned/manned helicopters/drones including maintenance/maintenance teams;
- "Mothership" for the SeeBtl, KS M and KS K rescue boats on the flood deck;
- Mini-"Joint Support Ship" (JSS) by fitting mobile planning rooms and loads in the vehicle deck;
- Platform for "Joint Fire Support";
- "Training ship" for officer candidates by equipping mobile classrooms (as on CH "Jeanne d'Arc");
- Transport and landing of a reinforced naval infantry company of the naval battalion with all personnel and material (incl. protected vehicles);
- Transport and construction of a mobile field camp or military hospital on a foreign coast, also via the beach;
- Transport of around 1,500 tonnes of relief supplies for disaster areas (humanitarian aid); delivery via the beach if necessary;
- Combination with lightweight "ferry imposts" (e.g. MEXE Float System);
- Temporary admission of up to approx. 1,000 "people in distress at sea" etc.
Could it be possible in future to harmonise the - at least in principle still existing - requirements for two JSS with the requirements for the "replacement tender class 404 / new MEZS"?
Yours sincerely
B. Krüger
As commander of the Somalia Support Unit and co-author of the operation order "Southern Cross" according to which this operation was carried out, I would like to make a total of 3 comments on the above text by the unknown or unnamed author and the two comments already published:
1. general findings
The summarised description of the processes and the discussions that arose in and around the Bundeswehr after the conclusion of Operation Southern Cross - particularly in the political sphere - largely corresponds to my own personal observations and experiences. Therefore, the "only source still available, the Wikipedia report" mentioned somewhat disparagingly in the text is really authentic and corresponds to the facts. I cannot share the regretful statement about the lack of a unified operational command and the resulting alleged chaos - led by the fleet command and the commander of the fleet. Rather, the lack of "unified command" was clearly at least two levels above in the area of military policy decision-makers. However, it must also be credited to them that they did not have the experience of today that clear and unambiguous agreements with supposedly reliable partners were not kept when the situation in Somalia deteriorated dramatically in autumn 1993. An expression of this decision-making uncertainty in the BMVg and beyond then led to the changing decisions in the selection of the naval unit in December 1993, when the fully equipped operational training unit - on whose units initial preliminary investigations had already been carried out into short-term conversions for a possible deployment off Somalia - was allowed to leave for South America. When space and time factors no longer permitted a realistic re-routing of the unit, the navy was seized at the "Portepeé" and managed to assemble, equip and deploy a unit within 5 days (deployment order 24 January 1994 / departure of first unit: 28 January 1994), which - as the review shows - fulfilled the mission in full.
2. discussion about the equipment
All the futile attempts described above to translate the lessons learnt from Operation Southern Cross into usable naval armament projects (with the exception of command and control and telecommunications equipment) have - as correctly described - failed. Nevertheless, a review of naval operations over the last 25 years also shows that they were so diverse that "optimisation" for a specific type of operation would not really have helped in the "post-Somalia naval operations". The range of experience from the anti-piracy mission to Operation Sophia and now the "refocusing on national and alliance defence" (after we have just abolished the fast patrol boats as an experience from the missions "beyond Africa" due to the "advance warning time" that is supposedly to be calculated in decades!)
That is why the evaluative sentence about the mission in the above-mentioned article: "...as an improvisation a masterpiece in principle, but an indictment of poverty..." is wrong. Or to put it even more clearly: the military-protected transport mission (nothing more was required) was carried out in full and to the satisfaction of all those directly involved - it would not have gone any differently if "chambers with flat screens" had been available for the embarked soldiers. The fact that the Army contingent was transported away in 6 rounds was less due to the reception capacities of the naval organisation than to the Army's march planning from Beletuen to Djibouti.
However, this type of armaments planning, which takes into account the flexibility of the troops, also requires a minimum number of available units with different capabilities, which can then be combined into a unit depending on the mission. Whether with or without "ETRUS" or "Naumann-Arche", the navy's armaments planning over the last 25 years has tended to go in the negative direction.
3. management discussion
One of today's "creeds" of operational command is that the Southern Cross command structure would have been "chaotic". This may apply to the command levels above the TSK-FüKdo's (HFüKdo and Flottenkdo). Overall, the leadership of the "co-operative" units on the ground by the respective TSK command echelon was thoroughly goal-oriented and appropriate. It is true that the lessons learnt from the Bundeswehr deployments of the 1990s, with various intermediate stages such as "FüZBw", are among the birthplace of today's Bundeswehr Operational Command. Nevertheless, I think it is worth considering whether the overriding principle of "leadership from a single source" (training - preparation - deployment - mission evaluation - implementation of experience) can be maintained with today's "flat command structures". Especially when a "change of command" has to be carried out before each deployment. At the very least, these are highly personnel-intensive command structures. My staff during Operation Southern Cross consisted of 6 soldiers (Kdr, S3, SMO, FMO, signalling officer, HeeresVerbOffz). I've just read in the latest MarKdo announcements that the DEUMARFOR staff (not comparable, of course!) is to comprise 120 posts.
4 What remains?
The call to take stock is certainly correct and important - perhaps especially after 25 years. There is plenty of documentation, analyses and experience reports etc. available for this purpose. The "contemporary witnesses" are also still available. The ZMS is currently analysing the operation from a military history perspective. However, this record is of no use if it is not possible to involve the political decision-makers by placing the corresponding military policy or armaments policy "phase document" next to each "doctrine", which was then not implemented. In this respect, I fully agree with retired Captain Jopp's contribution - including his repeatedly called for and still missing "grand strategy".
Gottfried Hoch, KAdm (retired)
Thank you, Mr Admiral, for this personal report and the clarification! I hope there will be many readers.
The sailor
Bravo Zulu for the impetus and the discussion. Thank you, Mr Hoch, for your contribution!
Very true, Mr Jopp, very true! When I read the lines about the hasty US withdrawal, something similar flashed through my mind. Except that Afghanistan is beyond the reach of such ships.
I seem to remember that the multi-purpose ship failed at the time due to excessive demands. They probably wanted to take a fully equipped battalion with almost a thousand men and heavy equipment, which was simply too much.
Other navies have medium-sized landing ships that have a dock, can carry helicopters and have space for a military hospital or a reinforced company.
I have found two that you should take a look at:
- the Endurance class from Singapore (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Endurance-class_landing_platform_dock)
- the Italian San Giorgio class (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/San-Giorgio-Klasse)
They may not be new, but I find the design and performance parameters interesting. They are much more realistic than amphibious carriers of US dimensions,
finds
the sailor
Afghanistan was just a reminder that we should enter into a discussion about Plan B with other allies in view of the US President. The starting point must be an overview of the equipment to be returned. Required air transport must be planned for the longer term. Further considerations must be made by the SKB and the Army.
You are right to remember the Naumann Ark. Each TSK brought in its own special requests without these ever being discussed together.
Your proposals are a step in the right direction. We don't need a new construction project now that can be realised in 15 years at the earliest. Increased co-operation with France (Mistral) seems just as sensible as with the Netherlands (de Witt) or other EU/NATO partners.
We urgently need a European approach.
It is time to act. Germany's fiddling around must stop.
In principle, this demand is justified. In view of the realities in the BMVg and the German Bundestag, however, one can only conclude that neither the ministry leadership nor parliamentarians have a serious interest in coming to terms with the past and learning lessons.
But the memory of Somalia could be a wake-up call for 2019. Then as now, the motto was: in together, out together. And today, there is also a risk of an uncoordinated American withdrawal in Afghanistan. And then what? Do we have a plan B for an unorganised withdrawal from Afghanistan? Where will the capacities come from? Or will we end up like in Saigon, when the USA abandoned its ally?