We have carefully read the article on the 59th Naval Historical-Tactical Conference in the current issue of MarineForum. We were particularly interested in the reference to the lecture "Cross shots - lateral thinking - change of course: Jimmy Mann's Sylt fleet":
"Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann made a decisive change of course in 1991 at the beginning of his assignment as eighth inspector of the navy, which became known as the "Sylt Fleet". This came at a time of disorientation in defence policy and Admiral Mann was often accused of being 'too quick'. ... This led to lively discussions among conference participants from the first ranks who were involved in these events as contemporary witnesses or had experienced them."
Let's first ask what the "you're too fast" was referring to: To the inability of an entrenched apparatus to change course or to a lack of intellectual foresight on the part of fellow campaigners? We prick up our ears when the argument is made that nothing should be put on the table in advance without promises. It is also true that those who do not change will be changed!
As always, it's about moderation and the centre. You have to recognise the signs of the times early on. Today, the main drivers of change are demographics and technology (artificial intelligence/autonomous systems/cyber). How many marines will still be at sea in the future?
All in all, we are more on the side of uncomfortable lateral thinkers than of streamlined lords and ladies. And this Bundeswehr currently benefits from constructive lateral thinking.
English 
German
Dear Mr von Müller, since you are addressing me directly, I would also like to respond directly to your comment. You write:
"The authors of such plans have rarely made a career for themselves, but have gone down in history as pioneers." Above all, the authors have not been successful in pushing through their grand plans. Surely nobody would be naïve enough to assume that ideas will prevail in political decision-making by virtue of their genius. Surely the plans of all those involved are not put on the table and then a decision is made on the smartest one.
Let no one believe that an Alfred Thayer Clausewitz would have the chance to pave the future of the navy with a brilliant proposal. On the contrary, the more promising the plan for the navy, the greater the envy, fear and, above all, resistance from everyone else. You will never achieve everything you set out to do. Only quiet diplomacy, painstaking detailed work, balancing interests and coordinating with other stakeholders can advance the cause.
You claim that "whether "every military leader is well advised" to "make up his mind quietly" and "pull the strings in the background" may be helpful for the military leader's career, but not for the development of his army." If you have read my text, you will have realised that I take the opposite view.
You yourself confirm with the opening quote that the brilliant lone fighter who does not compromise on his idea will not be successful. Can it really be the aim of a person in charge to go down in history as a pioneering thinker with the cry: "You see, I was right back then"? An idea that cannot be implemented may be brilliant, but it is not helpful for the development of the army, as you put it, and therefore not good.
With regard to the Sylt fleet, we will never be able to determine in retrospect whether the navy would have been better off with one course or the other. This applies equally to all subsequent decisions that were made under the adverse circumstances and heavy impacts described above.
And here I have to contradict you once again. The suspension of compulsory military service was a huge change. Even though it used to be possible to refuse by postcard, that is not the same as the current situation. Back then, every young man had to deal with the issue of serving, and some of them opted for the navy. That no longer exists today. In other words, here too, the reality is very different from the view from afar,
states
the sailor
Whoever is behind the name "Segler" has made a contribution to this forum that is not only highly interesting but also allows conclusions to be drawn, provided it is a "military officer". Be that as it may, it was not only the Bundeswehr that was hit by the "major events with such force" 30 years ago; this force affected all the armies of the Western Alliance, especially the European ones. Obviously, the Alliance adapted to this force more sensibly than the Bundeswehr, even though the latter had to compensate for the NVA. The suspension of compulsory military service, whether sensible or not, came at a time when young people could decide by "postcard" whether to obey it or do civilian service or neither. I am not aware of any court cases from this period that would have held conscientious objectors to account. The "sailor's" argument that "great military masterminds had [no] significant influence on the course of events" is to be agreed with, because there were no "great military masterminds" in the Bundeswehr at the time. It is certainly a painful (often personal) experience, a truism, that the courage of a military leader who "goes public with the big idea" is not honoured, but it has often happened in history; the "public" only found out about it when the "big idea" was made public. Authors of such drafts have rarely made a career, but have gone down in history as thought leaders. Whether "every military leader is well advised" to "think his thoughts in silence" and "pull the strings in the background" may be helpful for the military leader's career, but not for the development of his army. A small note at the end: "Thinking outside the box always sounds sexy as long as you have no responsibility"; that is absolutely right. But it is even sexier to think outside the box when you have responsibility.
Morgan von Müller (that's my real name)
Here's to the crazy ones.
The misfits.
The rebels.
The troublemakers.
The round pegs in the square holes.
The ones who see things differently.
They're not fond of rules.
And they have no respect for the status quo.
You can quote them, disagree with them, glorify or vilify them.
But the only thing you can't do is ignore them.
Because they change things.
They push the human race forward.
And while some may see them as the crazy ones,
We see genius.
Because the people who are crazy enough to think
they can change the world,
Are the ones who do.
Apple, 1997
If you look at the history of change in the Bundeswehr over the last 30 years, the major events came with such force that it could not resist being shaped. This was the case with reunification, the financial collapse in 2008 (emergency sacrifice by Guttenberg) and the suspension of compulsory military service. You can't fool yourself into thinking that big military masterminds have any significant influence on the course of events. Added to this are the preferences and hobbies of political decision-makers, which cannot be contained by factual arguments.
The military leader who goes public with the big idea must always expect parts of it to be broken off. What is negative for him is then realised and he is shown up by being told that he proposed it himself. In any case, his courage is not honoured.
Against this backdrop, every military leader is well advised to think quietly, in a small circle of trusted advisors. They need to clarify where the journey should take them when reform is once again called for. Then it is important to look for allies and pull the strings in the background.
Thinking outside the box always sounds sexy as long as you have no responsibility. In reality, it's about a sense of proportion, skill and a good dose of patience for the right moment, remembers
the sailor
Just for the sake of correctness: In 1991 Admiral Mann was not at the beginning of his inspectorate, but at the end!
Here is an excerpt from Wikipedia that aptly outlines his work as a conceptualiser and trailblazer:
"On 1 October 1986, Mann became inspector of the navy. In this function, he initiated an inventory of the navy in 1987, which led to the conclusion that it would not be financially possible to replace the existing and slowly ageing fleet one-to-one with new ships and aircraft. The resulting considerations led to the Fleet 2005 concept, which was incorporated into the Navy's objectives (ZVM) published in March 1991 and provided for considerable reductions. The framework conditions had changed with the reunification of Germany in 1990. The absorption of the former NVA was accompanied by the demand to significantly reduce the size of the future Bundeswehr. Mann organised the process of taking over the Volksmarine through intensive personal contact with its leadership and officers, among other things. In this context, he attached great importance to treating the NVA personnel not with the attitude of a victor, but with the attitude of a partner, despite all the hardships of the transition. After completing his work on the ZVM, Mann retired on 30 September 1991."
Incidentally, I share the view of the contributor, especially with regard to "those who do not change will be changed"