A guest article by Raimund Wallner
On 3 February 2017, the Norwegian government announced that Germany, and not France, had been selected as the strategic partner for the submarine project to ensure the succession of the ULA class. The aim of the decision is the joint procurement and "lifetime management" of identical new submarines based on the German Class 212A, according to the statement from the Ministry of Defence.
The following bilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching an intergovernmental agreement will focus on determining the proportionate involvement of the respective national defence industries for the four Norwegian and two German boats to be delivered in the second half of the 2020s, reaching agreements on cooperation between the navies and official bodies of both countries and defining Germany's role as the "lead nation". Only then will negotiations with the Kiel-based submarine shipyard tkMS begin in order to finalise the technical and financial aspects of the winning bid against the state-owned DCNS shipyard to such an extent that the construction contract can be concluded in 2019. Before then - next spring - the government intends to "finalise the investment project Neue Submarines" to Parliament "as a strategic capability", which presumably means inclusion in the defence budget.
Immediately after the news was announced, DCNS, which was victorious against the Germans in Australia in April 2016, wrote in a press release that it regretted but respected the sovereign decision and was prepared to re-enter the market if the German-Norwegian negotiations failed. It was also convinced that its offer (a further developed "New SCORPENE") was the superior one, particularly in the area of submarine hunting, which was decisive for the far north.
Since the 1960s, Norway has had a total of 21 Submarines in Kiel and Emden, more than any other nation, but Oslo's decision in favour of the Germans was not a foregone conclusion. When only DCNS and tkMS remained in the final shortlist for the competition from April 2016 - South Korea, Italy, Sweden and Spain had previously been eliminated - the French went all out. Australia has shown how this can turn out. Lessons learnt down under were certainly not insignificant, but Norway is different. Technology, price, export experience, parent-navy support, political tailwind, excellent PR strategy, official and industrial approach from a single mould, etc...all of this was obviously right this time and this success has - like everyone - many fathers. The final efforts of the two rivals show just how close the race was in the home straight. The French organised an industry day in Oslo on 6 December 2016 in collaboration with the Norwegian Procurement Institute FSI, which was attended by all the big company names - and the press release from DCNS already reads like a proclamation of victory. The Germans literally countered "quietly": on 11 December, they sent the best and most modern thing they had up the Oslo Fjord: "Das Boot", in the form of the recently commissioned U36. The newspapers and blogs reported step by step how the "tysk ubåt 212A" to the capital, where it then served as an authentic backdrop for the official press conference on the submarine project. PR at its best!
What circumstances were decisive in the end for the victory of the design called U212NG according to informed circles?
It can be assumed that there was a clear willingness to generously accommodate the Norwegian industry (mainly Kongsberg) in its expectation of maximising its own system shares, even to the detriment of its own manufacturers. Here, the German ATLAS Elektronik in particular will have to forego the implementation of its FüWES ISUS and accept Kongsberg's MSI as the default (as was the case with the first batch at the time). 212A). The French are even likely to have offered know-how sharing in the missile area (FK), possibly for the still outstanding "submarinisation" of Kongsberg's "Naval Strike Missile" (NSM), but have shown little interest in purchasing this FK beyond that. The Germans, on the other hand, will ultimately have no choice but to procure large quantities of the NSM as a land-attack-capable naval target armament for their own two U212NGs and also for their surface units (possibly as a replacement for Harpoon). Perhaps this concession will ultimately be less a sacrifice on the altar of co-operation and more a good solution to the German Navy's missile problems.
Another point is speculative: DCNS went public in the summer of 2016, just in time for the Euronaval defence trade fair, with the announcement that it had developed a "fuel cell 2nd generation" (FC-2G) that works with nitrogen-enriched oxygen - in other words, breathing air - in combination with a diesel reformer, ready for use. This would not only eliminate the current German unique selling point of the "fuel cell AIP", but in future it would also be possible to generate the reactant hydrogen on board from the diesel fuel that is already carried in abundance. If it were not for the requirement of an absolutely sulphur-free, difficult to procure on the market, high-priced diesel for the highly complex, inefficient and signature-deteriorating (due to CO2As this author knows from corresponding studies, this would be a space-consuming reformer process; regular diesel fuel is therefore ruled out. HDW and later tkMS therefore focussed on the development of a methanol reformer years ago. With their "New SCORPENE", the French certainly offered the above-mentioned combination as an AIP. tkMS and the German authorities could have made the Norwegians aware of the hitch in this solution, backed it up with their own test results and thus damaged the opponent. Especially since such a system has not yet demonstrated one of the competition's criteria - operational suitability ("proven design").
Last but not least, the German intention to procure two identical boats for the "parent navy" may have been the final breakthrough. This presumably means the construction of the type boat ("first of class") for the German Navy and thus the commitment to act as "lead nation". A more efficient risk reduction over the entire course of the project for the - as rumoured - ambitious and costly design is inconceivable. The French were unable to match this, as they maintain an exclusively nuclear-powered submarine weapon and only build conventional submarines for export.
What is U212NG?
Nothing is known about the design in open sources, not even a rough sketch, no technical data and certainly no price tag. The German design philosophy of "as small as possible and as big as necessary" has not worked in Australia compared to the "think big" mantra. Even the derivation of the tkMS range from a "premium design", which was appreciated by the Norwegians U212A for the German Navy suggests that the U212NG remained true to this philosophy. However, the year 2017 has different requirements than the year 1987, when U212 was first designed. Since 2008 at the latest, when the frigate Bayern achieved spectacular detection ranges against the extremely small U206A in the Bay of Biscay with the low-frequency, active towed sonar LFTAS, the reduction and optimisation of the target echo strength (TES) has been a must for every modern design, whereby coating is ineffective against the low-frequency and thus long-wave sonar radiation, but structural shaping (acoustic mirroring) is required.
The Germans will insist on their proven amagnetic design, the signature reduction also includes a low snorkelling rate and thus a second diesel engine, which makes the U212A The constriction characterising the rear pressure vessel has been eliminated. As the methanol reformer is not "proven", the metal hydride storage for hydrogen will probably remain, but with a larger capacity. For the Arctic region, the Norwegians will insist on a drastic increase in both the regular and AIP driving range, i.e. significantly increased diesel and liquid oxygen supplies. Two pressurised compartments and appropriate docking facilities for the NATO Submarine Rescue System (NSRS), of which Norway is one of the operators, are likely to be required. These parameters will significantly increase the size of the boat and therefore also require a more powerful propulsion engine. Lithium-ion batteries with significantly improved energy density will replace the lead-acid technology that has been tried and tested for over 100 years, which, in addition to many operational advantages, will result in an up to four-fold increase in discharge time at maximum speed, for example. In terms of dimensions, all this means an estimated 10 metre extension, an increased pressure hull diameter and an increased displacement of around 2,000 tonnes. It can be assumed that the U212NG with IDAS will be able to defend itself against flying tormentors, and that the cooperation with Norway and Germany will be a success. Submarines should finally result in a sea target FK has already been discussed above.
Implications
The German Navy is coming for a 7th and 8th visit. Submarinewhich the majority of their senior decision-makers, who are characterised by surface warfare, will only be very slow to rejoice about - if at all - and certainly not the budget holders. Although an increase in the defence budget is no longer taboo "thanks" to the Putin and Trump effect, the shipbuilding sector will have great difficulty coping with several major projects in parallel over the next 10 years; keywords: corvettes, MK180, fleet tankers. However, if the Dutch and possibly even the Poles join the German-Norwegian submarine project (as expressly hoped for in the Norwegian declaration quoted at the beginning), then there will be no turning back for Berlin. Malicious tongues claim that this is the only reason why Germany still has Submarinesbecause its submarine industry is one of the key defence technologies. And indeed, this project creates the new national technological reference it needs to continue to be the world market leader in non-nuclear submarine construction. In this respect, the Australian defeat was a painful but bearable slip-up, because nobody else needs a "leviathan" like the SHORTFIN BARRACUDA - a U212NG, on the other hand, has what it takes to become the new international benchmark and will secure the competitiveness of the Kiel shipyard and its suppliers well into the 2030s. The announcement of the submarine cooperation has already signalled a willingness to strengthen the alliance's northern flank and fits into the landscape. It is time for the German Navy - and above all the politicians - to realise what strategic potential Germany has with its submarine weapon.
The original article appears in the current issue of the magazine of the Verband Deutscher Ubootfahrer (VdU), "Emergence"
English 
German
If you have the (https://warisboring.com/its-unlikely-but-u-s-diesel-subs-would-be-one-way-to-take-on-china-d34c6a3db565#.sws9rfog1) here, you can see completely different possibilities for diesel submarines in the world, notes
the sailor
As far as the future possibilities of modern submarines with conventional propulsion are concerned, I am completely with you. The U.S. Navy argued and still argues with the huge distances from the home bases to the possible deployment areas. That's why it makes more sense to me to cooperate more closely with the respective allies on the ground and network them with U.S. ships. South Korea, Singapore and Japan are classic partners here.
With a view to Europe (northern flank area with Norway), the Baltic Sea (Sweden, Poland, Germany, Denmark) or the Mediterranean (France, Spain, Italy, Greece), there are many joint operational possibilities and thus also future options.
For unsolid, the question arises in the short term as to whether we should deploy more of our submarines in exercises and operations in the Baltic Sea. This would also send a clear signal to the USA and the US Navy.
Followed the thread with interest & profit. That's exactly why you should read meerverstehen.
If I understand the author correctly, despite the (working?) designation U212NG, this is de facto a new class,
asks
the sailor
You are quite right, even if tkMS gives the impression in its press release of 3 February 2017 that it is an "already...deployed submarine", i.e. that little effort is involved:
"During the selection process for the best submarine partner, we
Norway an evolutionary approach. The fact that thyssenkrupp Marine Systems can supply an existing submarine that has already been used with great success was an important criterion in the decision, as this avoids a costly development project."
But further down in the explanation it says:
"The German offer is based on the HDW Class 212A, of which ten submarines have already been produced. This class will be further developed for Norway and delivered as the HDW Class 212NG (Norway-Germany/Next Generation)."
You can assume that the industry will pay for this "further development" (to put it mildly) with huge "one-off costs". So it would be clean to choose a new class designation, but better from a sales point of view to stick with the old one and put an NG after it. This would signalise: The German Navy, as the "parent navy", regards this boat as its very own offspring...
Thank you for this very well researched article.
A few final remarks on politics and the navy. I have the feeling that TKMS was and is very well supported by the "coastal mafia" of MPs.
Regarding the navy: French Admiral Castex already threw the battleship on the rubbish heap in his strategic theories in the 1930s and recognised the great future importance of submarines. Incidentally, he was the same admiral who founded the French Institute des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale and was its first president. That brings us to strategic issues.
Another look at history:
As much as the submarine would later be associated with German naval warfare, the Imperial Navy was hesitant when it came to introducing this new means of naval warfare. Grand Admiral Alfred v. Tirpitz, who developed the Kaiser's favourite armed force - the fleet - into an instrument for achieving world domination, later justified this in "Memoirs" with his "tried and tested method of waiting to see how useful a new invention would be in war before introducing it generally". He had "refused to throw money away on submarines as long as they could only sail in coastal waters...but as soon as seaworthy boats were built", he was the first to "promote them on a large scale and, despite the imposed lack of money, pushed them to the limits of our technical capabilities".
My conclusion: In peacetime, the German Admiralty always preferred visible flagstaffs; only when things got serious and the Schimmernde Wehr (WWI) or the thick ships (WWII) were no longer able to make a mark on the high seas did the U-boats have to bear the burden of war all by themselves.
It was no different in the German Navy - peacetime...in this respect the author is quite right: without this powerful industry there would not be a single submarine left in this navy
@ U-869: It is certainly tempting to adhere to such a simple view of the world that the U-boats had to carry the burden of war all by themselves. This is simply wrong for the Second World War because it overlooks the large number of small units in coastal defence that carried a huge load until the end of the German minesweeping service in 1947. They were much more extensive than the U-boat armour and also suffered large losses, perhaps not as high in percentage terms.
Furthermore, the German submarines did not win any of the world wars, but the superiority at sea lay with the surface forces of the Allies. The British long-range blockade in the First World War was based on this, as was the war-deciding convoy system in the Second World War.
Surface ships are therefore not shimmering defences with no combat value, but the backbone of superior naval powers as a means of sea control. Submarines and mines are the means of sea denial for the inferior, if you want to use the classical theory of naval warfare.
During the Cold War, we were only capable of sea denial in the Baltic Sea. That's why we wanted to lay mines and had a lot of submarines. In the North Sea, it was all about securing supplies. Sea control and the necessary surface forces were needed there. This good combination was what made the Bundesmarine.
Even today, it is not a question of either/or, but of the right both/and. A powerful submarine weapon is important, but many of today's and tomorrow's tasks can only be accomplished with surface vessels. This includes, among other things, a demonstrative presence, a different and more meaningful approach to shimmering defence.
Such a balance is helpful - in the equipment and in the discussion
finds
the sailor
That wasn't my point at all. It was about Castex's realisation that new technologies should also be taken into account in strategic considerations. In doing so, he came to the conclusion that in future a combination (!) of aircraft and submarines could achieve more than battleships. I don't need to be convinced of the balance of naval warfare resources.
Dear Mr Jopp, my post was not directed at you at all, but at @U-869, and my only concern was the inadmissible simplification that the submarines alone bore the burden of the world wars. It's just as clear that big ships aren't everything,
thinks
the sailor
D'accord.
@ Sailor,
Thank you for this lesson in German naval history and cold war rationale!
Then you should know that the term "shimmering defence" was used by critics of Tirpitz's naval armament as a fighting term; perhaps I should have put it in quotation marks. Incidentally, I did not question the usefulness of surface forces in the past and present, and certainly not that of a balanced fleet!