Ukrainian southern offensive exploits weaknesses in the Russian navy

Following the strengthening of Ukrainian coastal defences in the north-west quadrant of the Black Sea in recent weeks, the southern offensive just launched by the Ukrainian armed forces could promise success, as Russia is clearly no longer in a position to control and "hold down" this coastal section from the sea. On the contrary: Ukraine has shown with individual steps that it can certainly disrupt the enemy forces around Sevastopol with targeted attacks in such a way that the Russian navy can only move safely in the area of the coastal defence of Crimea.

Seen on the timeline

The damage to and sinking of the "Moskva" on 14 April effectively eliminated the Russian Navy's extensive air defence and airspace control, because even the remaining modern units of the Black Sea Fleet only have point defence weapons for the airspace. The provisional "substitute air defence" set up on Snake Island, which could have been used to control the sea and airspace off Odessa, was destroyed by the Ukrainian recapture on 30 June. The naval aviation forces now stationed in Crimea were severely clipped in the attack on the Saky airbase on 9 August and a few days later in the Dzhankoi area. Drone attacks on the staff buildings in the harbour complex of Sevastopol - albeit without causing serious damage - also restricted the operational capabilities of the naval command. The replacement of the head of the Black Sea Fleet is not exactly a motivational boost for the units under the St Andrew's Cross! Forcing the acceptance of grain deliveries by sea from Ukrainian harbours (and thus the de facto lifting of the naval blockade), as well as assigning responsibility for the global food crisis to Russia, can also be added to the overall picture on a completely different level.

Change of tide?

Everything recognisably strengthens the Ukrainian narrative of the intended recovery of the southern territories around Khersones. And one thing has also become clear: Neither the ability to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the important port city of Odessa, nor Putin's original geostrategic goal of controlling the entire southern coast of Ukraine from the Sea of Azov beyond Crimea to Transnistria (and thus most of the Black Sea) can still be maintained. Although there is hardly any Ukrainian navy left to confront the entire Black Sea fleet, it appears rather exhausted and only seems capable of limited operations from the land defence of Crimea. This is a fatal picture. Ukraine would now do well to utilise the momentum generated by the Russian "weak spot" at sea for its land operations. However, this will only work if it continues to disrupt the Crimea by sea with all possible means in such a way that Russian support for its own land forces must be limited. However, an exaggerated Ukrainian deployment at sea could also lead to the Black Sea Fleet rearing its head, which must surely not be as tired as it appears at the moment! In addition, there is still the Ukrainian nuclear power plant on the Dnieper, with which Russia is playing a macabre game.

Strategic hope

In any case, it is easy to see how Ukraine can now utilise strategic pressure from the sea for its land operations. Perhaps another contributing factor is that the "solidarity community of maritime nations" (The Conversation of 31 August 2022, see source) is increasingly in a position to exert control over global supply chains by means of sanctions and thus achieve strategic effects that can "dry up" a war waged by land powers such as Russia in the longer term. Are we there yet - or is this just "wishful thinking"?

Sources: Own reporting; The Conversation, Melbourne, 31.08.2022; "Ukraine war: how Kyiv's southern offensive will exploit Russia's naval vulnerabilities"