Helge Ingstad on his way to the shipyard on 8 January 2021. Photo: forsvaret.no

Helge Ingstad on his way to the shipyard on 8 January 2021. Photo: forsvaret.no

Compared - but not forgotten: The case of "Helge Ingstad"

Seven years after the collision between the Norwegian frigate "Helge Ingstad" and the tanker "Sola TS", the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the Spanish shipyard Navantia have reached an out-of-court settlement. According to a statement on the Norwegian government website (https://www.regjeringen.no/) on 2 June 2025, the settlement includes discounts worth up to EUR 47.5 million on future maintenance and modernisation services for the remaining units of the Fridtjof-Nansen Class. The dispute raised questions that go far beyond direct legal responsibility.

Helge Ingstad ready for transport, photo: Norwegian Navy

Helge Ingstad after her salvage in the floating dock ready for transport, Photo: Norwegian Navy

More than just a navigation error

The official accident analysis by the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) formally exonerated Navantia - the sinking of the frigate was not caused by a design flaw alone, but by a chain of operational errors. However, the picture was not that clear: water had penetrated through damaged propeller shafts through several bulkheads that had previously been considered watertight. In the engine room, but also in the watertight bulkheads and doors, there were weaknesses in the design and in the application of operational procedures.

However, the core cause remains the situation management on the bridge. The navigation crew mistook the illuminated "Sola TS" for a stationary object on land. The "Helge Ingstad" was sailing without AIS and communication with the traffic control centre remained vague. Navigational perception failed, as did ship defence awareness. After the collision, the frigate was grounded - but the continuity of the bulkheads, open hatches and hesitant damage management led to the total loss. The fact that no crew members lost their lives in the accident was not a matter of course - and speaks for the professionalism and presence of mind of those involved in the evacuation phase. In retrospect, this is a rare bright spot in the tragedy.

Legal conclusion - the shadow remains

The agreement with Navantia may be pragmatic and understandable. Spain avoids a landmark case on construction responsibility. Instead of the 13 billion Norwegian kroner (approx. 1.2 billion euros) originally demanded, Oslo will receive discounts on measures accompanying the term of the Fridtjof-Nansen class. This corresponds to around 16 per cent of the estimated cost of a new frigate, which according to current plans is around NOK 9.5 billion (approx. EUR 900 million) per unit. In view of this, the compensation seems rather symbolic and only covers a fraction of the actual costs for the loss of the "Helge Ingstad".

What remains is not just a loss of capability, but a structural warning. The loss of a modern AEGIS ship shows the vulnerability of even highly developed platforms if training, procedures and technology do not mesh at every moment.

The Ministry of Defence repeatedly emphasised that comprehensive consequences had been drawn from the incident. For its part, the Norwegian Navy responded with concrete measures - above all through a targeted improvement in bridge training, more consistent training in damage control and more structured handling of crew rotation.

Nevertheless, one bitter lesson remains: it was not the enemy that sank the "Helge Ingstad", but the sum of our own failings. The "Helge Ingstad" case reveals the vulnerability of even highly developed platforms if training, procedures and technology do not mesh smoothly at every moment. In a complex, dynamic combat environment, a single or minor oversight - whether in situation assessment, bridge routines or damage management - is often enough to plunge the entire system into disaster in a chain of independent but mutually reinforcing weaknesses.

Europe's navies have skills, invest in equipment and train regularly - but the case shows that technical and tactical risk awareness is not just a question of regulations or checklists, but also, and perhaps above all, a question of attitude. Situational awareness must be taught, cultivated and actively cultivated in everyday life. This is the only way to develop a form of resilience that remains viable even under time pressure, in complex situations and under stress.

The loss of the "Helge Ingstad" may have been legally finalised - operationally and culturally, it remains a reminder of how fragile navigare necesse est can be.

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