Quo vadis, Navy?

How should the German Navy develop in the long term in the face of changing times, demographic trends and bureaucratic restrictions? Eight experts share their views on the current concept paper "Naval Vision 2035+".

The Naval Vision 2035+ published on 28 March 2023 is a concise paper that deals with naval tasks and fleet structure in an understandable and concise manner without dwelling on the cloudy style of many other strategy documents. The implied goal-means-route relationship is remarkably illuminating. The clear underlining that the navy is a capital-intensive endeavour, while at the same time pushing unmanned systems - in poker jargon: all in - stands out positively.

The future fleet structure may already awaken many a dream thanks to its chic graphic realisation, but it forgets the less attractive topics that are currently much more virulent in the navy: Ammunition, equipment, infrastructure, recruitment. It's true: Navies must think long-term and act pragmatically and in the short term. According to former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Failing to plan is planning to fail." It is important to navigate through this area of tension. It is important to emphasise key necessities or, for those in the know, common knowledge. These include the importance of maritime presence, which is not only counted in flagstaffs, and the ability to engage in high-intensity combat. Naval mathematics - one ship in action requires three - and demographic constraints also stand out.

There has not been such an official statement from the Navy for some time. With the already published Kompass Marine and the umbrella document Marine, which is currently being drafted, a family of key point papers is now being created that will certainly provide an opportunity for debate. In the following, German experts express their views on individual aspects of the target picture in the form of food for thought. Counter-speech is welcome!

Dr Sebastian Bruns is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and was previously a McCain-Fulbright Visiting Professor at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.

Scenario of a military conflict on the northern flank

In recent years, the German Navy has repeatedly emphasised that it does not want to be reduced to a Baltic Sea navy. Today, the 2035+ target vision emphasises the need for a high level of combat readiness and presence on NATO's northern flank - i.e. the North Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea. Both are understandable and correct. Together with its international partners, the German Navy must prepare for the possibility of an armed conflict on the northern flank. This has been necessary since 2014, which makes it all the more important that the target picture now refers to strike power, naval warfare and defence in four of the seven performance requirements mentioned, and also includes the risk of entire units failing. The distinction between the maritime requirements in individual sea areas also shows how significant and diverse the requirements of the individual operational areas, such as the Baltic Sea, are. What the target picture correctly implies: Even with a possible northward expansion of NATO, the need for a capability for high-intensity combat on the entire northern flank and thus also in the Baltic Sea region remains. This is because as long as a potential adversary is based and active in a closed sea area such as the Baltic Sea, it is not possible to speak of controlling this operational area.

For good reason, the capability for maritime strike is emphasised in conjunction with the ability for surface and underwater warfare, with which German and allied naval forces must face regional anti-access/area-denial challenges. The multidimensional aspect is therefore reciprocal, particularly in the Baltic Sea: in the form of the risks to be overcome, but also in the form of the response that must be provided in the context of multi-domain operations. The Navy 2035+ target picture thus proves that the German Navy is aware of its tasks and requirements for the mission of deterrence as well as national and alliance defence in the entire North Flank area and the Baltic Sea in particular.

Julian Pawlak is a research associate at the Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (GIDS).

 The Arctic relevance of the northern flank

In terms of security policy, the Arctic-North Atlantic region is becoming increasingly important for the transatlantic alliance and Germany: the German Navy wants to focus in particular on NATO's northern flank. In the NATO context, in a minimalist interpretation, the countries of the northern flank include Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Iceland, Norway and the United Kingdom. In an expanded interpretation, this includes the NATO Baltic Sea states, i.e. the Baltic states and Poland as well as Finland and Sweden, which as (future) new NATO members are also considered allied Arctic nations.

These are the allies whose territorial waters and exclusive economic zones lie in the polar region and at the same time in the area of responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur). These are, on the one hand - in the northernmost form in the Atlantic - Canada and Denmark with the autonomous territory of Greenland. Adjacent to this is the demilitarised archipelago of Svalbard, which belongs to Norway. In the broadest sense, Iceland, which borders the Arctic Circle, and the USA, which has a direct passage to the Arctic Ocean in Alaska, are among the Arctic states of the Alliance.

If this is projected onto a map, it becomes clear that the Greenland Sea, the Labrador Sea, Baffin Bay, the Norwegian Sea and the Arctic Ocean can be counted as part of NATO's area of interest. The Alliance's area of interest, or Saceur's area of operations, is defined as the area encompassing the territories of the European allies and the enclosed sea areas and then extending in the North Atlantic from the North Pole to the Tropic of Capricorn and westwards to the east coast of North America.

This is the area for which NATO governments have already given the Saceur a mandate to assume responsibility in peacetime. Even the geographical definition makes it clear that "NATO is an Arctic alliance", as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in August 2022. However, NATO's attention currently remains primarily focussed on the coastal regions and less on the Central Arctic.

Dr Michael Paul is Senior Fellow and Frigate Captain Göran Swistek is a guest researcher in the Security Policy Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

Continuation of the paradigm shift

Under the keywords of coastal defence and coastal combat, the 2035+ naval vision calls for amphibious capabilities for the Bundeswehr for the first time since the end of the Cold War, and on an equal footing with other types of maritime operations. This is not new: in the previous target vision (2025+), the term expeditionary navy was still used. This was also intended to support its own forces on land from the sea - but this was more in line with strategic sea transport.

The Bundeswehr's concept from 2018 also stipulated that "limited amphibious operations" would once again determine the capabilities of the naval forces. While the scope of duties of the Navy's infantry forces was still almost exclusively limited to object protection and boarding missions until 2014, the Navy is now very clearly emphasising the need for capabilities to conduct amphibious operations. Their mission is to "control relevant coastal areas on the sea and land side" and to form "changing centres of gravity in the coastal region".

This is definitely a continuation of the paradigm shift, also in the thinking of the naval leadership, which began with the establishment of the naval battalion in 2014 and was consistently continued with the integration into the Dutch Mariniers Corps. This is because the marines from Eckernförde, closely modelled on their Dutch partners and the Royal Marines, are to gather "expertise for what is probably the most complex of all military missions" for the Bundeswehr - landing operations. This is what the Bundeswehr writes on its own website.

However, a glance at the fleet of vehicles in the new target image shows that this statement of intent is hardly backed up by amphibious platforms. The "up to 18 Future Combat Surface Systems" listed could, however, initially be classic combat boats, such as the Swedish CB 90, which, in addition to deploying infantry forces in battalion strength, could also carry out unmanned reconnaissance missions or secure critical infrastructure in a subsequent step.

In future, the navy will also be able to use combat boats to deploy small, mobile raiding parties, i.e. raiding parties in company or battalion strength, including support elements such as snipers, drone operators or emergency paramedics. The strength of such forces lies in their ability to attack enemy forces directly or via the hinterland, independently of each other and utilising the element of surprise. The aim is to disrupt enemy actions in a needle-like manner or to gain strategic points such as harbours, air bases or missile positions. Defence against enemy irregular forces would also be possible in this way. Equipped with steep-fire weapons such as mortars, light missiles such as Hellfire or Spike-ER, reconnaissance sensors and mines, combat boats could also prevent or at least impede amphibious landings by enemy forces in the coastal apron.

However, amphibious operations are always joint force operations, and this is the problem with the 2035+ target picture: Although the Navy can provide the Bundeswehr with partial amphibious capabilities, a joint command is required to lead such operations. It must therefore first be the task of the other organisational areas to draw up their target documents in coordination with the Navy.

Former frigate captain Arne Björn Krüger set up the sea battalion in 2014.

Opportunities for an internationally active national coastguard?

In the Federal Chancellor's plain language speech at the 2022 Bundeswehr Conference, the following words were uttered with regard to the core mission of national and alliance defence: "All other tasks must be subordinate to it [the mission]." If this implies a withdrawal from EU and UN missions, the question arises as to how future humanitarian control and monitoring missions are to be carried out.

The Federal Police, currently present with small units in Operation Poseidon in the Mediterranean, has initial experience in maritime missions abroad, which are carried out with the help of a personnel pool of customs and water police officers. The Federal Office for Agriculture and Food (BLE) is regularly involved in control activities in the North Atlantic with its large fishery protection boats. Basic expertise for small and large missions is therefore available. There is also no shortage of vessels. The Coast Guard Coordination Network alone has 15 vessels from 49 metres in length, which are generally suitable for sea areas outside the Baltic Sea and the German Bight.

There is a lack of bundling of responsibilities. Customs and the Federal Police have already entered into a co-operation in terms of personnel on board their ships, but the Waterways and Shipping Administration and the BLE have been left out. If we created a single authority that could carry out the tasks of maritime police, river police and law enforcement at sea from any seagoing unit, ships would be utilised more effectively and there would be an opportunity to send existing units on international missions.

Including the water police of the federal states and the associated standardisation of responsibilities in the territorial sea and the Exclusive Economic Zone would create a national coastguard force of at least 5,000 people. Concentrating the navy on its core tasks creates a gap in foreign policy. It is questionable whether the numerous deployments and permanent naval units will allow further Freedom of Navigation Operations (Fonops). A civilian coastguard could therefore become a particularly effective foreign policy instrument. Equipped with enforcement powers, at best mandated by the EU and UN, this non-military soft power would be a clever non-combatant solution, especially if the focus is on controlling civilian shipping, for example when monitoring an embargo.

The deployment of a coastguard would presumably meet with cross-party approval, as neither warships nor soldiers are involved. The broadly defined European Security Strategy gives an internationally active national coastguard the necessary legal leeway. The fact that it needs a standardised structure to combat blue crime is almost secondary.

Till Andrzejewski is a police officer and coastal boat skipper with the Lower Saxony Water Police.

Courage for a (partially) autonomous system

In principle, the Navy's 2035+ target vision reflects the global trend of (semi-)autonomous systems being increasingly integrated into the armed forces. They are thus becoming a natural part of military and maritime reality. It should not be forgotten that (semi-)autonomous systems should never be considered in isolation from other military contexts and structures. If they are integrated into the armed forces, they must function within the existing military systems, infrastructures and strategic cultures - for example, mission tactics and Innere Führung.
Although autonomous systems will only be used for the "three Ds" - dirty, dull, dangerous - for the foreseeable future, rapid developments towards (partially) autonomous combat-capable systems can also be observed. One special feature should be emphasised here: Until kinetic weapons are deployed - whatever form this may take - the system can also serve as a data supplier. And this data must be stored, prepared, processed, analysed and made available in some way - and in such a way that all relevant parts of the armed forces can also access it. To put it bluntly: the most beautifully high-tech system is of little use if the server is still running Windows 95.

This results in the "war before the war". Interfaces and data management will become the elementary levers of future military effectiveness. This has considerable organisational implications, as the demands on personnel are changing and software expertise is becoming indispensable. To summarise, it can therefore be said that The mindset must change. The sea remains the same, but the framework conditions are changing massively.

Sebastian Schwartz works at the intersection of sci-fi, technical peace and conflict research, the digital industry, nerddom and autonomous systems.

Better situational awareness through closer cooperation

After the inspector of the German Navy called in an interview with the German Press Agency in February for maritime critical infrastructure to be better protected in future and for "civilian, governmental and non-governmental sensor data" to be brought together for this purpose, this topic is now being taken up again in the Marine 2035+ vision.

It states that the navy needs "organised cooperative relationships to exchange information with other agencies." This would require a network for data exchange as well as sea-based means for gathering information in centres of gravity and artificial intelligence to support data analysis. Hans-Peter Bartels also recently emphasised: "This is why the alliance needs new sensors and effective means, but above all it needs all available civilian and military data to be brought together immediately."

In order to be able to meet this demand for digital data fusion and thus achieve a largely complete underwater and surface situation picture, the company believes that an overarching government coordination centre is needed to bring all organisations together quickly. Numerous partners, including on behalf of the federal government, are working on the digitalisation of the oceans, for example by using artificial intelligence and big data analyses to develop software as a service for maritime geoinformation for authorities, such as the explosive ordnance disposal service of the state of Schleswig-Holstein.

Data-driven and trustworthy data spaces for efficient collaboration and digitalisation in the offshore wind industry are also being developed together with the operators in the offshore industry. On behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, we are also working hard to realise an Internet of underwater things.

How could the navy benefit from these initiatives? On the one hand, a joint use case with industry would be conceivable, for example as part of the Marispace-X funding project of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate. This €15 million project aims to create a digital maritime data space by the end of 2024 based on data sovereignty, security, interoperability and modularity. On the other hand, a project with the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW) in Kiel, which is already cooperating successfully with civil industry and research, would also be conceivable. A project is currently being planned with the NATO CRME in La Spezia, which is testing the use of a highly scalable data platform for its own sensor data analysis. As a result, German companies are already available today with maritime geodata expertise for future projects and, to put it in naval jargon, are just waiting for the "manoeuvre whistle".

Jann Wendt is CEO of north.io GmbH, initiator of the Kiel Munition Clearance Week and coordinator of Marispace-X.

Sebastian Bruns