The maritime dimension of US policy in the Pacific region

President Barack Obama's administration had already turned its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. The pivot to Asia continues to influence American policy to this day.

In a speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, then US President Barack Obama announced the US's pivot towards Asia: a deliberately pithy slogan that resonated with the audience in Canberra. However, others were also listening. America's NATO allies noted with concern the shift of diplomatic attention and military capabilities to the Pacific region. As a result, the Obama administration had to rush to reassure its European partners that the US would not abandon them. According to the United States, the shift in focus was more of a shift in emphasis than a blanket transfer of economic, diplomatic and military activities from Europe to Asia. Nonetheless, the "pivot to Asia" was based on a geostrategic rationale: even back then, the USA wanted to counter China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. However, critics soon pointed out that the announcement caused more fear than actual change. After Obama's speech, the US military presence in the Pacific increased only slightly.

A decade later, this shift in focus remains the cornerstone of US foreign and security policy in Asia. During Donald J. Trump's presidency, this policy manifested itself in friendlier diplomatic relations and deepened military cooperation with India, as well as a hard edge on China, particularly in trade talks. Today, Joseph Biden's administration is softer in its criticism of China, but still seems determined to implement the centre of gravity shift strategy, proactively addressing economic, diplomatic and maritime challenges. The recent trilateral agreement between the US, UK and Australia (Aukus) suggests that military activity will increase as part of the pivot. So what exactly are the Americans trying to achieve with this focus on Asia in general and maritime affairs in particular?

The concept of shifting the centre of gravity

The fundamental purpose of the shift in focus is to provide economic, diplomatic and military incentives to US allies and partners in Asia to counterbalance growing Chinese influence in the Pacific. According to a script based on realist and neo-realist thinking about international relations, the increased US presence is intended to pave a way for Asian states to stand up to Chinese pressure. Otherwise, Asian nations may decide to side with China, making concessions to its powerful neighbour in order to avoid further demands from Beijing and divert its attention to other countries. Politicians in Asian capitals increasingly welcome this American foreign and security policy, as it provides them with the means to defend their interests. In a diplomatic sense, the American shift in focus can be seen as a "focal point" for Asian states under pressure; the US presence is intended to reassure the region's capitals that they are not alone.

Aircraft carriers such as the Carl Vinson and the Nimitz form the backbone of America's military presence in the Pacific, photo: US Navy

At the same time, informal mechanisms and limited resources are offered so that states can coordinate their foreign and security policy multilaterally and increase their collective capabilities. This is because China's growing power in Asia is an engine that drives actors in the region to work together. The Biden administration has therefore not particularly emphasised the partnership between the USA and India in its first year in office. Nonetheless, cooperation between the Indian and American navies is accelerating as government officials and military leaders in both countries explore opportunities for collaboration.

Barack Obama was the 44th president from 2009 to 2017
of the United States, Photo: The White House

On the economic front, the shift in focus was originally touted as a way to promote economic development and engagement across Asia. In contrast to the more vigorous diplomatic and military initiatives of the US, efforts in this area have so far remained piecemeal. Since announcing the shift in focus, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has adopted more trade agreements, not only to boost economic activity but also to serve as a counter to China's economic might. However, the Trump administration decided to abandon participation in Asean-inspired multilateral trade forums in favour of bilateral trade deals. There are indications that the Biden administration may re-engage in multilateral agreements negotiated by Asean.

Since the shift in focus began, the United States has taken an increasingly strong stance against reckless Chinese trade practices. The Trump administration has raised concerns about trade deficits and China's unfair business practices - intellectual property theft and unfair treatment of foreign companies top the list of criticised abuses. It imposed tariffs on Chinese imports, restricted China's access to American technology and limited foreign investment in China. The Biden administration has quietly maintained most of these Trump-era policies, including import tariffs, despite the fact that US business leaders are increasingly complaining that the costs of these tariffs are largely passed on to American companies and consumers. The so-called trade war between the US and China continues to hurt the economies of both countries. Yet governments across Asia have for the most part been conspicuously silent on the trade dispute - concerns about unequal access to China's markets, inadequate intellectual property protection and forced technology transfers appear to be widespread across Asia.

Submarine of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Photo: PLAN

Photo: US Navy

Although Beijing often accuses American officials of employing a "Cold War mentality", the shifting centre of gravity strategy is more of an attempt to encourage and shape the developing resistance to China's growing power in Asia. Increased American diplomatic and military activities have helped regional actors to "throw a spanner in the works" of Beijing's power projection. This is also the purpose of the Aukus Agreement, which, in addition to the sale of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, also promises the delivery of stand-off weapons and increased cooperation in the areas of cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Fortunately, Washington's less than successful economic policies have not slowed the increasing multilateral efforts of its Asian allies and partners. Overall, the shift in emphasis is less the start of a new Cold War than a time-buying strategy to show Beijing that its behaviour is provoking resistance. In Washington, there is still hope that the consistent modelling of democratic values and deeper integration into the global economy will temper the more aggressive and autocratic tendencies of the Chinese Communist Party.

The maritime situation in the Western Pacific

Despite the objective of containing China's influence, the strategic environment in the Pacific is deteriorating, particularly from a maritime perspective. The US Navy is confronted with a fundamentally changed situation: it no longer has naval supremacy in the waters from the Asian mainland to the first island chain in the Western Pacific. This is in stark contrast to the situation immediately after the end of the Cold War, when US defence planners could still rely on unimpeded access to the world's oceans and most coastal regions. American aircraft carrier battle groups and expeditionary forces could quickly reach the scene of any crisis and project air power ashore, conduct amphibious operations, or provide humanitarian assistance without facing a significant threat at sea. Of course, these missions occasionally resulted in casualties. Attacks occurred when commanders misjudged the security situation and exposed their ships to the limited range of enemy weapons. One example of this was successful attacks with explosive-laden skiffs. However, such actions could not affect the fulfilment of the American Navy's mission. Today, their officers face the tactical-operational challenge of having to win a battle at sea in the Western Pacific before they can influence events on land. Today, operational planners assume that their maritime "supremacy is unclear".

This fundamental change in the maritime environment is the result of three mutually reinforcing developments that occurred shortly after the Obama administration announced the shift in focus. The first development is the increasing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). The most visible part of this effort is the family of ground-launched medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles designated DF. The DF-21D is a mobile, ground-launched missile with a range of approximately 1000 miles, reportedly capable of engaging naval targets with nuclear and conventional payloads. The road-mobile DF-26 mobile extends the engagement range to approximately 2000 miles.

China's fleet is to be expanded to up to 460 ships by 2030, photo: US Navy

These ballistic missiles are complemented by an extensive inventory of Soviet-designed maritime cruise missiles, notably the YJ-18. At a military parade in October 2019, China unveiled two new maritime cruise missiles: the DF-17 hypersonic cruise missile and the DF-100 cruise missile. China also uses satellites and over-the-horizon radar systems to support the targeting of its growing missile forces. New autonomous systems, hypersonic missiles and artificial intelligence and space capabilities are under development. They have only one target in mind - the US Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups. According to some observers, the Chinese missiles already deployed and the new technologies planned are "breakthrough" systems. They pose fundamental challenges to the ability of the US Navy and its partners to conduct surface operations within a few thousand miles of the Chinese mainland.

The second development is the sheer growth of the Chinese Navy (PLAN). While American warships are more capable than their PLAN counterparts, China now has the largest naval force in the world with 355 ships. Their expected expansion to 460 warships by 2030 is even more worrying. These ships are not missile-carrying coast guard vessels - the PLAN has 85 such ships that are not included in these figures - but modern multi-role platforms with advanced anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defence sensors and weapons. This increase in numbers is accompanied by a growing focus on joint maritime operations with the PLA, allowing the PLAN to operate at a greater distance from its own coastal waters. The United States is unable to keep pace with the PLAN's rapid build-up due to existing manufacturing and shipyard capabilities, as well as specified ship maintenance requirements.

A third factor that has an unfavourable effect on the balance of power is the "tyranny of distance". Distances to operational areas have an influence on the assessment of the combat effectiveness of enemy navies. The importance of this factor was demonstrated around 100 years ago during the negotiations for the Washington Naval Agreement, which was intended to limit the fleet size and shipbuilding expenditure of the world's major navies. A widely used parameter at the time suggested that for every 1000 nautical miles of distance that had to be covered to reach an operational area, a ten per cent reduction in combat effectiveness had to be taken into account. Distance therefore quickly has a negative effect on the side that is located far away from the theatre of operations. For the American Navy, the situation today is as follows: Due to training, ferrying and material maintenance requirements, it needs six or more Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to ensure that one of them is operational in the Western Pacific.

The impact of these developments on the maritime balance of power in the Pacific means that naval supremacy is in dispute for the US Navy. War could emerge as a battle to gain control of the waters between the Asian mainland and possibly beyond the first island chain. What is particularly alarming about this state of affairs is the fact that in the tactical and operational starting position of naval warfare, the side that shoots first and effectively generally wins the battle. Ship and fleet battles are similar to a gunfight on land - the gunslinger who hits his opponent first usually wins the duel. Therefore, naval encounters can be tense even in peacetime, as the side that shoots effectively first usually emerges victorious. Being the first to fire effectively would be doubly important for the outnumbered fleet to reduce the firepower of a superior opponent at the outset of hostilities. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet navies negotiated the 1972 Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea. It was intended to reduce the likelihood of unintended escalation by avoiding accidents and provocative behaviour. No such agreement exists for operational encounters between the US Navy and the PLAN. However, it remains unclear whether governments realise how the constraints of naval warfare might conflict with general military and political thinking in Washington - and, for that matter, in Beijing. Battles at sea follow a tactical and operational logic, and this logic is not always apparent to elected political officials.

Implications for Germany

How should German politicians and strategists react to the increasing competition between major powers, systems and orders in the Indo-Pacific region? How can they utilise their country's strengths? What role can the German Navy play in this?

The American strategy of containing China's power through multinational cooperation is in line with one of the most important principles of German foreign and security policy: the commitment to act within a multilateral framework and to promote international cooperation worldwide. There are also similarities in strategic thinking: in order to moderate the expansive and autocratic tendencies of the Chinese Communist Party, all available diplomatic, economic, military and cultural means of power are being utilised in the sense of a networked security policy. The cross-departmental strategic approach set out in the 2016 White Paper and the 2020 Indo-Pacific Guidelines provides an excellent framework for planning the role that the German Navy can play in this.

Due to globalisation and the resulting dependence of national economies on international trade flows and functioning information and communication systems, free and secure access to the world's oceans is increasingly becoming the focus of foreign and security policy. As a result, the importance of naval forces is growing worldwide. Germany is particularly dependent on globally functioning framework conditions. Its prosperity and national income, as well as the political influence associated with its economic power, are based on a rules-based international order and free, unhindered global trade. Even if Germany is a land power, not least for geographical reasons, and forms the backbone of conventional defence in Europe, German foreign and security policy must make greater efforts to do justice to the changed situation on the world's oceans. Germany should clearly signalise that it has a vital interest in protecting freedom of navigation and is prepared to play an active role in shaping the global order by adapting its military capabilities accordingly.

With the deployment of the frigate Bayern, Germany has taken a first step in this direction. In Washington, both the State Department and the Pentagon see this as confirmation that Germany recognises the American shift of focus to Asia as strategically necessary and also views the changing maritime situation in the Indo-Pacific as a cause for concern. For the US government, it is important that Germany also contributes to demonstrating the unity of the West in its endeavours to moderate China's aggressive foreign policy - even if this jeopardises Germany's traditional role as a trustworthy mediator and intermediary vis-à-vis Beijing. However, following the rather symbolic contribution of a frigate on a training cruise, the USA expects Germany to provide military capabilities in future to help balance the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The participation of German ships in major naval manoeuvres, their temporary integration into aircraft carrier battle groups, but also the participation of the army and air force in exercises would be suitable measures for this. For the Bundeswehr, this means that it must pay more attention to interoperability with the US armed forces and other partners in the region.

The 2016 White Paper emphasises the close security partnership with the USA and Germany's willingness to be a reliable ally. With the pivot to Asia, the transatlantic bargain that has existed since the founding of NATO is once again becoming highly relevant. Washington not only expects its allies to assume more responsibility for security in Europe if the USA turns its attention more strongly to the Indo-Pacific. US politicians and strategists are also demanding that allies compensate for the increased efforts of American forces in Europe, which are currently necessary due to Russia's aggressive foreign policy, elsewhere where American interests are affected. In doing so, they are looking above all to Germany, from which they not only want a stronger military commitment. German politicians should also use their influence in NATO and the EU to take Beijing's aggressive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific adequately into account in the upcoming development of strategic concepts.

Conclusions

Analysing the security situation in the Indo-Pacific makes it clear that the deployment of naval forces there requires a change in mindset. Naval supremacy in these waters is no longer in the hands of the NATO allies and their partners. The Chinese navy already has numerical superiority in the main weapon systems. Even more decisive is its advantage of being able to operate close to home. In contrast to the USA and its European allies, its combat power does not diminish when it is deployed to distant theatres. The lack of international agreements with clear patterns of action that regulate behaviour at sea and help to avoid misunderstandings that trigger crises is particularly problematic. The risk of escalation here is higher than it has been since the end of the Cold War. It is not just a question of the German Navy adapting to this threat. As a trading nation and a country that relies on the export of its goods, Germany should take a proactive approach and use its strengths to promote multilateral cooperation in arms control and confidence building, as envisaged in the Indo-Pacific guidelines.

Strategic analysts rightly point out that Europe and Asia are closely linked in terms of foreign and security policy. Events in one region influence developments in the other, both politically, diplomatically and militarily. Even if an alliance between China and Russia is unlikely, it is conceivable that Moscow will opportunistically exploit conflicts in the Western Pacific to expand its sphere of power and influence. This is another reason why Germany has a vital interest in peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. In view of the generally unstable and tense geopolitical situation in the Western Pacific, the voyage of the frigate Bayern sent an initial signal, but not a clear political message. From a purely military point of view, it was not a risk-free action.

Colonel i.G. Dr phil. Uwe Hartmann, Uwe is Visiting Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, USA. James J. Wirtz, Ph.D., is Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.

Uwe Hartmann and James J. Wirtz